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THE UNCOORDINATED PUBLIC DOMAIN
ROBERT SPOO*
When nations amend their copyright laws in response to calls for
international harmonization, they usually expand authors’ rights
without also seeking to harmonize national public domains. Divergent
national copyright laws have resulted in an uncoordinated global public
domain that renders authors’ works freely available for use in some
countries while subjecting them to copyright or moral-rights protection
in others. While the fragmented global commons thwarts many valuable
uses of cultural resources, it has especially deleterious effects on the
ability of researchers to access, copy, and disseminate historical and
literary materials, many of which remain unpublished. These effects are
mirrored and exacerbated by the inconsistent policies of cultural
repositories that control access to millions of documents and images.
The uncoordinated public domain shares certain features—notably,
fragmented ownership and resource underuse—with an anticommons.
This Article offers a theoretical framework for understanding the
uncoordinated public domain, and illustrates the tragic inefficiencies of
this patchwork commons by discussing its impact on a number of
research and publishing projects involving modern authors—in
particular, James Joyce. A balanced solution to the checkerboard
effects of the commons would be to employ a treaty-based system of
compulsory licenses to harmonize national public domains and to
coordinate the legal conditions whereby the world’s vast informational
resources could be globally disseminated by researchers and other
users.
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INTRODUCTION
The creativity that copyrights protect is a public good. Because
public goods are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous—that is, by their
nature, they cannot be fenced off, and their consumption by one person
does not prevent others from consuming them equally—they pose
certain problems not found in the law of real or personal property.1
Copyrighted works, in our age of digital reproduction and online
distribution, may be made instantly available for consumption by many
persons in many places at the same time, thus fully inhabiting their role
as public goods. If copyright laws were uniform in all respects
throughout the world, works would receive protection for a fixed
number of years (most copyrights have limited terms) 2 and then would
enter a single, global public domain where they could be exploited by
anyone anywhere without permission or risk of liability. But copyright
laws are not uniform throughout the world. Profound disparities in the
See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 164 n.13 (2002); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387–89 (1954). I do not discuss here the ways in
which anti-circumvention technologies and other digital, contractual, or statutory protections may
alter the nonexcludable character of public goods, such as copyrighted works. See generally
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (exploring the dangers posed to the public
domain, broadly construed, by federal anti-circumvention laws, proposed mass-market licensing
rules, and proposed federal database legislation).
2 Perpetual copyrights are rare today, but they exist in some countries. For example, copyrights in
unpublished literary, dramatic, and musical works are perpetual in Australia. See infra note 140
and accompanying text. Copyrights in certain unpublished governmental works are perpetual in
Singapore. See Copyright Act, 1987, c. 63, § 197 (Sing.). The United Kingdom has enacted
special legislation creating a perpetual charitable royalty in performances, broadcasts, and
publications of J.M. Barrie’s play, Peter Pan. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c.
48, § 301 (Eng.). In France, authors’ moral rights (though not their copyrights) are perpetual. See
infra notes 196–199 and accompanying text.
1
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length and scope of copyrights from country to country create global
disharmony in the protection and availability of creative works. The
most significant consequence of this disharmony, for the present
inquiry, is that it perpetuates a tragedy of the uncoordinated public
domain. As discussed below, this uncoordinated global commons shares
features with what has come to be known as an anticommons3—
notably, fragmented conditions of ownership and resulting resource
underuse—though it differs in a number of ways as well.
The uncoordinated public domain that has resulted from divergent
national copyright laws renders authors’ rights and users’ privileges
challenging to define from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If copyright
permissions were always easily obtained, or if legal exceptions favoring
users—such as fair use—were uniform throughout the world, then this
global disharmony would be less troublesome. But copyright exceptions
vary widely from country to country; 4 and literary estates (and other
copyright owners) are often unpredictable. Sometimes they are
intractable, uncomprehending, or financially unreasonable, even when
users succeed in locating them.5 Often, copyright owners cannot be
located at all, and many countries do not require copyrights to be
registered,6 with the result that users are confronted with an “orphan
works” problem, for which, again, no uniform transjurisdictional legal
solution exists.7 The challenge of unknown or uncooperative owners is
See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (articulating a theory of the anticommons
and discussing types of anticommons).
4 See infra notes 84–105 and accompanying text.
5 Literary estates that have been notoriously obstructive include those of Samuel Beckett, Bertolt
Brecht, T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, Marianne Moore, Sylvia Plath, and J.D. Salinger. See Matthew
Rimmer, Copyright Estates and Cultural Festivals, 2 SCRIPTED: J.L. TECH. & SOC’Y 345, 368–
69, 402–03, 406-08, 408–412, 427 (2005), http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol23/bloomsday.pdf (discussing the estates of Beckett, Brecht, Eliot, Joyce, Plath, and Salinger);
Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem of Heirs, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1819–27 (2009) (discussing Eliot, Moore, and Beckett); D.T. Max, The
Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Suppressing Scholarship?, NEW YORKER, June
19, 2006, at 34, 36–37 (discussing Eliot, Joyce, Moore, and Plath).
6 See Marc E. Hankin, Comment: Now that We Know “The Way Forward,” Let Us Stay the
Course, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1300 n.20 (2002) (“Most countries throughout the world
neither require nor permit registration of copyrights . . . .”); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and
Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 149 (2010) (noting the “strong international norm in favor of
automatic copyright protection without registration or renewal requirements”).
7 For example, Canadian legislation authorizes the Copyright Board of Canada to issue
nonexclusive licenses to anyone, for a specified period and a royalty fee, for the use exclusively
within Canada of published works and fixed performances and broadcasts when rights-holders
cannot be located and the applicant has made reasonable efforts to locate them. See Copyright
Act, R.S.C., 1985, c C-42, § 77 (Can.); COPYRIGHT BD. OF CAN., UNLOCATABLE COPYRIGHT
OWNERS (2001), http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/brochure2-e.html. A 2012
E.U. directive permits libraries and other heritage institutions in the European Union, after a
diligent search for copyright owners, to reproduce and make publicly available published and
certain unpublished orphan works held in the institutions’ collections. See Directive 2012/28/EU
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Oct. 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of
3
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especially acute with respect to unpublished works.8 I am chiefly
concerned in this Article with what has been called the unpublished
public domain: works that have not been disseminated to the public and
in which copyright protection, if it ever existed, has expired.9 In many
cases the vast resources of the unpublished public domain are held in
cultural repositories throughout the world, but, because of divergent
national copyright laws, unpredictable estates, and inconsistent archival
norms, these resources often remain underexploited. The result is a
tragedy of the uncoordinated global commons. The victims of this
resource tragedy include thwarted users of unpublished materials along
with the public, which is deprived of cultural and informational
benefits.
In suggesting that the uncoordinated public domain has a tragic
aspect, I am aware that the notion of resource tragedy has classically
been applied to a physical commons, such as an over-fished lake or an
over-grazed pasture. When Garrett Hardin articulated the idea of the
tragedy of the commons,10 he was thinking of Greek tragedies in which
the central hero’s hubristic choices set in motion the machinery of fate

Orphan Works, O.J. (L.299) pmbl. ¶¶ 1, 13, art. 1, ¶ 2, art. 6, ¶ 1. The United Kingdom has
established rules, separate from the E.U. initiative, that permit anyone, after a diligent search for
the copyright owner, to obtain from the U.K. Intellectual Property Office a nonexclusive license
for use of an orphan work, published or unpublished, exclusively within the United Kingdom,
after payment of an application fee and a reasonable license fee to be held in escrow in the event
the copyright owner identifies herself. See Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24, §
77 (Eng.) (codified in Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 116A (Eng.));
Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) Regulations, 2014, SI
2014/2863, ¶¶ 3–4, 6, 8–10 (Eng.); LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 330–32 (4th ed. 2014). Plainly, there are stark differences among the British,
Canadian, and E.U. rules regarding who may seek a license and the kinds of works that may be
licensed. In the United States, legislation has been proposed, but not enacted, that would limit the
damages recoverable for infringement of the copyright in an orphan work if the infringer
performed a reasonably diligent search for the copyright owner and met other statutory
requirements. See Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008).
8 See R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private: Copyright’s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85
TEX. L. REV. 585, 605 (2007) (discussing the costs involved in “tracing copyright ownership of
older unpublished works”).
9 For a similar use of “unpublished public domain,” see id. at 586–88; Elizabeth Townsend Gard,
January 1, 2003: The Birth of the Unpublished Public Domain and Its International Implications,
24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 690 (2006); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on
Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 809–811 (2006). There are many definitions of the public
domain. See Reese, supra note 8, at 586–88 nn.3–7; Pamela Samuelson, Challenges in Mapping
the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN
INFORMATION LAW 7, 9–21 (Lucie Guibault et al. eds., 2006). I use the term here largely in the
sense of “works for which legal protection under copyright law has expired,” see Reese, supra
note 8, at 588, though I consider certain user-benefiting rules, such as fair use, to be commonsexpanding devices. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. The impact of rule-fragmentation
on two other public domains—those of published works and of sound recordings—is discussed
infra Part I.
10 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968).
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that inexorably leads to collective disaster.11 Hardin’s rational
herdsmen, each maximizing his gain by grazing his cattle without
regard for the land’s carrying capacity, are tragic heroes “locked into a
system” that eventually “brings ruin to all.”12 The curtain is rung down
on a scene in which individual belief in the freedom of the commons
has led to the catastrophe of resource destruction. The essence of
Hardin’s tragedy is the remorseless consequences arising from
unlimited behavior in a limited environment.
Resource tragedies may also come to unlimited environments.13
Michael Heller has traced the tragedy of the anticommons—in which
fragmented ownership or fragmented decision-making results in the
underuse of a resource14—to such diverse public goods as drug
patents,15 music sampling,16 documentary films,17 and air traffic control
standards.18 Here, tragedy is found not in the eventual extinction of a
physical resource, but rather in the present-day gridlock and “wasteful
underuse” of a resource that by its nature is nonexcludable and
nonrivalrous.19 A public-good anticommons can result from failure to
aggregate or coordinate fragments of intangible ownership in ways that
would permit decision-making and unlock the value of the stagnating
resource.20 Tragedy is experienced in the day-to-day futility of an
unlimited resource rather than anticipated in the future demise of a
limited one.
The uncoordinated public domain poses just such a problem of
unlimited but stagnating resources. This public domain is not an
anticommons, but it shares with some types of anticommons the daily
tragedy of gridlock and wasteful underuse brought about by
uncoordinated rules and stymied decision-making. Tragedy in this
See id. at 1244 (“The essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the
solemnity of the remorseless working of things.”) (quoting A.N. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE
MODERN WORLD 17 (1948)); see also JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS, STUDIES OF THE GREEK
POETS, FIRST SERIES 204 (2d ed. 1877) (“Nemesis [or avenging fate] is the fundamental idea of
the Greek tragedy. It appears strongest in Æschylus, as a prophetic and awful law, mysteriously
felt and terribly revealed.”).
12 Hardin, supra note 10, at 1244.
13 See Eli M. Salzberger, Economic Analysis of the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 27, 33–36, 39 (L. Guibault
et al. eds., 2006) (comparing and contrasting tragedies of the physical commons and the
intangible public domain).
14 See Michael Heller, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 1–2, 26 (2008).
15 See id. at 4–6.
16 See id. at 13–16.
17 See id. at 9–11.
18 See id. at 19. For examples of a regulatory anticommons, see id. at 2 (competing state and
federal regulation of financial instruments); see also id. at 3–4 (spectrum gridlock resulting from
the FCC’s granting of hundreds of regional licenses).
19 See id. at 26.
20 See id. at 2.
11
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public domain is not manifested in congested ownership of a single
resource, as with an anticommons,21 but instead in the underexploitation of a resource, such as a work of authorship, subject to
inconsistent copyright laws that render the resource freely available for
unauthorized use in some countries but protected by copyright in others.
Here the stage of tragedy is global, or multinational. Wasteful underuse
is projected upon the plane of geography—a product of uncoordinated
national rules—not unlike Europe’s inefficient air traffic control system
that has been described as “fragmented by national boundaries and
differing technical standards.”22
It is true that we can expect some public-domain congestion to
dissipate as older works gradually shed their copyrights in various
countries. But a true global commons for many works of authorship is a
distant prospect and will remain so as long as sharply divergent and
sometimes anomalous laws—for example, the 2039 rule for
unpublished works in the United Kingdom,23 the ninety-five-yearsfrom-publication durational term for older published works in the
United States,24 and the author’s-life-plus-eighty-years term in
Spain25—continue to erect barriers to unauthorized worldwide
dissemination. Transition can sometimes take on the features of
tragedy.26 For some works in some countries, the transition from
copyright to public domain will be so protracted that resource underuse
will be a familiar experience for many years to come. Moreover, some
features of international copyright law, such as post-copyright
copyrights in the European Union27 and the tendency of nations to
revive or extend copyrights for older works, 28 threaten to make publicdomain tragedy a permanent or at least a recurrent performance on the
global stage.
While many aspects of copyright law produce global disharmony, I

See Henry C. Mitchell, THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS: TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 54–55 (2005).
22 See HELLER, supra note 14, at 19 (quoting John Tagliabue, A Debate in Europe over Air
Traffic Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, (Travel), at 3). Some scholars have questioned the
use of geographical metaphors for characterizing copyright’s public domain. E.g., Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 121, 127–37 (L. Guibault
et al. eds., 2006). I am not using geography as a metaphor here, but rather identifying it as an
actual, bounded, nation-based obstacle to a global information commons.
23 See infra notes 143–150 and accompanying text.
24 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
26 Cf. HELLER, supra note 14, at 63–64 (critiquing the notion that short-term gridlock effects in
drug development are merely transitions rather than tragedies).
27 See infra notes 151–186 and accompanying text.
28 See Joseph P. Liu, The New Public Domain, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1395, 1425-27 (2013)
(warning against future extensions of U.S. copyright terms); see also infra notes 91–93 and
accompanying text.
21
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focus primarily here on disparities in copyright duration, moral rights,
and certain subsidiary rules, such as copyright limitations and
exceptions.29 By “global public domain,” I do not refer to all countries
of the world, but rather to certain large and significant markets, as
defined in the various contexts I isolate. An analysis of the conflicting
laws of all nations is beyond the scope of this Article and would simply
augment the picture of commons-fragmenting disharmony that I
present. Indeed, the phrase “public domain” is something of a sanguine
abstraction, since the divergences among national laws actually fracture
the globe into many public domains.30 Moreover, I use “public domain”
and “commons” interchangeably here, fully aware that these terms
denote different kinds of resources for some legal analysts.31 When I
liken what I call the uncoordinated public domain to certain
anticommons problems, I am bringing together different property
concepts for the purpose of highlighting commonalities of resource
underuse and related pathologies.
This Article seeks to make visible a global problem of resource
underuse that remains hidden as long as we fail to see that
harmonization of disparate public domains is as important as
harmonizing authors’ rights on the international level. 32 The world’s
conflicting copyright and moral-rights regimes undermine the ability of
users to engage in unfettered copying and dissemination of materials
that may reside in the public domains of some or many countries, but
not all countries. The fragmentation of the world’s commons is
especially wasteful and demoralizing in a time when digital
technologies and the Internet have made cross-border dissemination of
texts and images virtually costless.33 While both owners and users of
One could also explore, for example, varying national treatments of protectable subject matter,
copyright ownership, and licensing and assignments. See, e.g., Marketa Trimble, The Multiplicity
of Copyright Laws on the Internet, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L.J. 339, 344 (2015).
Some commentators treat fair use and other user-benefiting limitations and exceptions—some of
which I discuss infra Parts I.B-I.C—as components of a broadly conceived public domain. E.g.,
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 68 (2003).
30 Scholars sometimes use the term “public domain” even when they are fully aware that there is
no such unitary commons. See, e.g., SUSAN M. BIELSTEIN, PERMISSIONS, A SURVIVAL GUIDE:
BLUNT TALK ABOUT ART AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 35 (2006) (“That there exists a public
domain is universally acknowledged, though . . . countries may differ on when cultural property
enters it.”).
31 See, e.g., David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652,
685 n.146 (2010) (noting that use of “the term ‘information commons’ to refer to the public
domain is somewhat misleading, because commons were subject to limited property rights”).
32 Cf. HELLER, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that anticommons gridlock can remain “hidden”
because “underuse is often hard to spot”).
33 See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 464–71 (2015);
see also Salzberger, supra note 13, at 51 (contrasting national and global conceptions of IP
wealth maximization, and noting that “[i]deas cross territorial and political boundaries. . . .
Intellectual community activities are a-territorial”).
29
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copyrights are affected by these divergent laws, I am particularly
concerned here with the plight of users, who, often dependent on
copyright-free materials for their own authorship, are at the mercy of
internationally mismatched property rules and the real or feared veto
power of owners, and therefore keenly feel the impact of the
uncoordinated global public domain.34
Part I of this Article sets the conceptual stage by distinguishing
among a commons, an anticommons, and an uncoordinated public
domain. After illustrating the impact of global copyright disharmony on
a particular, culturally important work (Finnegans Wake by James
Joyce (1882-1941)), Part I discusses three aspects of the uncoordinated
public domain: the confusing rule of the shorter term, purportedly
adopted for harmonizing divergent national copyright durations but in
fact often applied in unpredictable, disharmonizing ways; divergent
subsidiary copyright rules, such as limitations and exceptions to
owners’ rights, which contribute to the difficulties of unauthorized
cross-border use of works; and the confused, conflicting laws governing
pre-1972 sound recordings within the United States. Each of these
examples offers a view of the fragmented cathedral of the global
commons, where uncoordinated laws render the public domain local
and piecemeal and threaten to make it difficult or impossible for
unauthorized users to engage in unconstrained exploitation of works in
global contexts.
Part II isolates a particularly tragic dimension of the uncoordinated
public domain by focusing on the globally fragmented rules that impede
the availability and use of unpublished works. A vast, uncharted cultural
resource, the unpublished public domain is burdened by a bewildering
array of conflicting national copyright and moral-rights laws that makes
it difficult for researchers and other users to engage in
transjurisdictional dissemination of important though often unknown
materials. Part II vividly illustrates the wasteful underuse of the global
public domain by showing how a current, real-life scholarly project
organized to publish the unpublished letters of James Joyce has been
confined to limited geographical distribution as a result of
internationally discordant copyright laws, moral-rights restrictions, and
post-copyright copyrights. Compounding this global disharmony are the
practices of cultural repositories, whose informal norms regarding
access to and copying of the materials they hold sometimes add a
further layer of fragmentation and disharmony to the legal gridlock of
the uncoordinated public domain.
Digital technologies are increasingly erasing the artificial legal distinction between authors and
users. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an International Instrument on
Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright: Final Report, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE 38 (2008),
https://www.iprsonline.org/resources/IntLE_HugenholtzOkediji.pdf.
34
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Finally, Part III argues that some of the tragic effects of the
uncoordinated public domain might be averted, or at least mitigated, by
the adoption of an international, treaty-based scheme of compulsory
licensing. Such a system would not repeal disharmony as the underlying
legal reality of national copyright duration, but instead would permit
users to bypass that legal reality and to exploit works in copyright
countries by giving notice to copyright owners and agreeing to pay them
a reasonable use fee. Compulsory licensing would thus function as a
global liability rule to strike a balance between users’ needs and
owners’ entitlements, and would approximate, resource by resource,
license by license, a hybrid global commons consisting of traditional
public-domain materials and licensed-domain materials. Although such
a scheme would not easily solve all problems—authors’ moral rights,
for example, might prove resistant to compulsory licensing—it would
be a significant step toward constructing a functionally unified global
public domain. The familiar legislative goal of harmonizing copyrights
would thus have a counterpart in a matching effort to harmonize public
domains; and tragic underuse of important historical and cultural
materials could give way to fruitful dissemination.
I. COMMONS, ANTICOMMONS, UNCOORDINATED PUBLIC DOMAIN
An uncoordinated public domain bears a certain resemblance to
the more familiar anticommons. An anticommons is the antithesis of a
nonexcludable resource commons. An anticommons results when
multiple exclusive ownership rights concentrated in the same resource
cannot be coordinated for purposes of decision-making, and as a
consequence the resource suffers from underuse.35 In early post-Soviet
Moscow—to mention a canonical example—several owners typically
held competing rights in the same commercial storefront, so that
coordination of these rights proved difficult, and many storefronts
remained unleased and empty.36 Whereas a commons is threatened with
overuse—too many exploiters of a single unowned resource37—an
anticommons is threatened with underuse: too many owners of a single
proprietary resource. Unrestrained group access can spell doom for a
commons; unrestrained group exclusion creates an anticommons.38
Expanding the dramatic metaphor lurking in the concept of tragedy, we
might say that, in a threatened commons, the stage is overrun by unruly
actors to the point where the drama loses all coherence. In an underused
anticommons, the production has so many quarrelling investors that the
play never gets put on at all.
35
36
37
38

See HELLER, supra note 14, at 1–2.
See id. at 145–64; Heller, supra note 3, at 633–42.
See Hardin, supra note 10, at 1244–45.
See HELLER, supra note 14, at 40–41.
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A copyright anticommons is essentially no different from the
Moscow storefront. The tendency toward underuse that is already
inherent in a public-good monopoly39 is intensified when multiple
owners of exclusive rights in a copyrighted work can block each other.40
Suppose, for example, that a researcher discovers an unpublished novel
in a university archive. The novel seems significant, and its author, now
deceased, is regarded as a major innovator of fiction. The scholar
prepares the novel for publication, complete with an introduction and
explanatory notes, and interests a press in publishing the edition. The
scholar discovers, however, that multiple remote heirs of the author,
more than a dozen, hold equal co-ownership rights in the work.41 The
heirs are scattered throughout the world, and it proves difficult to obtain
the permission the press requires from each of them. The resulting
coordination problem is exacerbated by the fact that the author’s estate
has no executor who can fill the vacuum of decision-making. The newly
discovered novel, fully prepared for the press, remains unavailable in
published form because there is no one who can easily gather the pieces
of the copyright into an exclusively licensed bundle. Thus, an important
document of literary history remains locked in an archive.42
See Lemley, supra note 33, at 468 (noting that IP laws artificially create scarcity in public
goods along with a deadweight loss to consumers and a lack of price-disciplining competition).
40 See HELLER, supra note 14, at 45 (distinguishing between monopoly and anticommons). An
anticommons can exist with respect to a public good no less than real property. For example, a
copyright anticommons became apparent when the creators of a 1987 television documentary on
Martin Luther King, Jr., attempted to re-release the film as a DVD years after its initial broadcast.
During the intervening years, licenses that had originally been granted by interviewees, Dr.
King’s estate, and others had expired, and the process of negotiating new permissions took nearly
twenty years and hundreds of thousands of dollars. See id. at 9–11. Another common example of
a public-good anticommons is the “patent thicket,” where the inability to coordinate multiple
patent rights contained within an invention blocks its commercialization. See id. at 5, 43; see also
Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine
War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 166–67 (2011) (characterizing historical patent thickets
as an anticommons problem).
41 Cf. HELLER, supra note 14, at 2 (describing the anticommons gridlock that often arises when
multiple children inherit the family home).
42 This hypothetical is based loosely, with alterations, on the discovery in 2009 of the typescript
of Amiable with Big Teeth, a novel by the Harlem Renaissance author Claude McKay (1889–
1948). The manuscript was unearthed by Jean-Christophe Cloutier in Columbia University’s Rare
Book and Manuscript Library. See Jean-Christophe Cloutier, Amiable with Big Teeth: The Case
of Claude McKay’s Last Novel, 20 MODERNISM/MODERNITY 557, 573 n.6 (2013). Cloutier and
coeditor Brent Hayes Edwards are arranging to publish a scholarly edition of the novel. See Email from Jean-Christophe Cloutier, Assistant Professor of English, Univ. of Pa., to Robert Spoo
(July 29, 2016, 09:31 CST) (on file with author). One possible solution to this hypothetical
copyright anticommons, in the United States at least, would be to locate one of the heirs who
would be willing to give the press a nonexclusive publishing license. Any copyright co-owner
may “[nonexclusively] use or . . . license the work as he or she wishes, subject only to the
obligation to account to the other joint owner[s] for any profits that are made.” Thomson v.
Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). But publishers’ norms favor exclusive licenses, not
nonexclusive ones. See STEPHEN FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK: WHAT EVERY WRITER
NEEDS TO KNOW 21–22 (12th ed. 2014); Frank R. Curtis, Protecting Authors in Copyright
Transfers: Revision Bill § 203 and the Alternatives, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 813–14 (1972); E39
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This is a straightforward example of a copyright anticommons:
underuse of a cultural resource resulting from fragmented,
uncoordinated ownership rights. Created by federal copyright law and
state intestacy law, this anticommons is confined to recognizable
jurisdictions and their rules—the federal and state laws of one country.
If we change the example to one involving a single copyright owner but
greater geographical complexity, a different coordination problem
emerges. Take a simple case of conflicting international laws governing
the duration of copyrights. James Joyce’s last book, Finnegans Wake,
was simultaneously published in Britain and the United States in 1939.43
In the European Union, which generally applies the term of the author’s
life plus seventy years, Finnegans Wake entered the public domains of
the United Kingdom and other E.U. countries at the end of 2011.44
However, in the United States, where the applicable copyright term for
works published prior to 1978 is ninety-five years from the year of first
publication,45 Finnegans Wake will remain in copyright through 2034.46
The estate of James Joyce has often shown itself unwilling to grant
permissions for scholarly projects,47 and, although at least one new
edition of Finnegans Wake has appeared in the European Union since
2011,48 no new editions have been created and published in the United

mail from Suzanne Ryan, Editor in Chief, Humanities, Oxford Univ. Press U.S.A., to Robert
Spoo (July 6, 2016, 08:50 CST) (on file with author).
43 See JOHN J. SLOCUM & HERBERT CAHOON, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JAMES JOYCE 59–61 (photo.
reprint 1971) (1953).
44 See Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L. 290) 9 (EC) (requiring member
countries to implement a term of protection equal to the life of the author plus seventy years)
[hereinafter Directive 93/98/EEC]. It is unclear as of this writing how Britain’s exit from the
European Union will eventually affect Britain’s intellectual property laws. See Richard
Rossington, No Need for Brexit Panic Over IP Laws, LAW. MONTHLY (June 29, 2016),
http://www.lawyer-monthly.com/2016/06/no-need-for-brexit-panic-over-ip-laws/. My discussion
of British and E.U. law in this Article is based on pre-Brexit conditions.
45 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(d)(1)(B), 112 Stat.
2827, 2828 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1998, 2002)) (increasing U.S. copyright
terms in works published before 1978 from seventy-five years to ninety-five years from the year
of first publication).
46 Because of uncoordinated or formality-based copyright terms, the situation illustrated here is
often reversed, with copyright in a work having expired in the United States and still existing in
the European Union. See BIELSTEIN, supra note 30, at 29 (discussing a Picasso etching that is
unprotected in the United States and protected in Europe).
47 See supra note 5 (citing authorities); see generally Robert Spoo, Archival Foreclosure: A
Scholar’s Lawsuit Against the Estate of James Joyce, 71 AM. ARCHIVIST 544 (2008) (discussing
the Joyce estate’s opposition to academic scholarship on Joyce).
48 A recent edition of Finnegans Wake, prepared and published in Europe by Robert Jan-Henkes,
Erik Bindervoet, and Finn Fordham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), is widely available
in Britain and the European Union. See E-mail from Finn Fordham, Professor of English, Royal
Holloway Univ. of London, to Robert Spoo (Oct. 4, 2015, 04:07 CST) (on file with author). This
edition is apparently available for importation into the United States, see E-mail from William S.
Brockman, Paterno Family Librarian for Literature, Penn State Univ. Arts and Humanities
Library, to Robert Spoo (Jan. 1, 2016, 11:36 CST) (on file with author), though it could not have
been lawfully created or initially published there without permission of the Joyce estate.
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States during that period.
In the absence of permission, this
geographical asymmetry of scholarly work on Joyce’s book is likely to
continue for years to come.
Even if Finnegans Wake had initially been published in Britain as
the sole country of origin, it would still likely be treated as protected in
the United States today, despite its public-domain status in the European
Union. This is because the United States does not apply what is called
the rule of the shorter term, adopted by other signatories to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne
Convention”) as an exception to Berne’s rule of national treatment
(which requires each Berne country to treat works originating in other
Berne countries as it would treat the works of its own authors).49 Under
the rule of the shorter term, Country B will not apply its longer
copyright term to a work whose copyright has expired in Country A, the
country of the work’s origin, but will instead apply the origin country’s
shorter term.50 Having omitted the rule from its limited adoption of the
Berne Convention,51 the United States protects many works whose
copyrights have expired in their countries of origin.52
The example of Finnegans Wake highlights a clash of national
rules that renders that important work freely available for public-domain
uses in some countries but not in others. The global gridlock that may
result resembles the central problem of an anticommons: the wasteful
underuse of a resource caused by fragmented, uncoordinated conditions
of ownership.53 Unlike a typical ownership anticommons, however, this
type of gridlock does not arise from a concentration of multiple owners’
rights in a single resource within a single jurisdiction, but rather from
the fact that a single copyright owner holds rights in the same resource
in some jurisdictions and not in others. This is resource gridlock cast
upon the plane of geography, an absence of transjurisdictional
coordination that hampers the unconsented use of the work throughout
the world. It does not make unauthorized copying and distribution
impossible, but it confines those activities to certain countries. In effect,
it renders the public domain local and piecemeal—a patchwork or
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text), art. 5(1),
July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 22 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
50 Id. art. 7(8); see also Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 704 (describing the rule of the shorter
term).
51 See 17 U.S.C. § 104(a), (c) (2012). For discussions of Berne’s rule of the shorter term,
sometimes called “comparison of terms,” and the choice of the United States not to adopt it, see
DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT: SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE DMCA 65–66, 78–80
(2003); Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 704.
52 See NIMMER, supra note 51, at 79–80.
53 See HELLER, supra note 14, at 26. The uncoordinated global public domain is not a new
phenomenon. See WILLIAM BRIGGS, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 546 (1906)
(explaining that national copyright duration “is almost entirely an arbitrary matter, and the
periods given vary considerably in the different countries”).
49
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checkerboard world commons.54 A global public domain will not arrive
for Finnegans Wake for nearly two more decades as a result of this
transjurisdictional conflict of laws: a tragedy of the uncoordinated
global commons.55
The inconsistent global commons that results from clashing
national laws renders it difficult or impossible for users to aggregate and
coordinate the conditions for unconstrained lawful cross-border
dissemination of works, a problem that mirrors some of the effects of a
sequential anticommons.56 Like the robber barons’ tollbooths that
sprang up along the Rhine River and hampered the flow of merchant
trade during the Middle Ages,57 today’s patchwork public domain
burdens the lawful dissemination of works, in effect erecting national
copyright tollbooths along the global Internet highway. 58 Unlike a
copyright anticommons, however, this form of gridlock directly impacts
the potential users of public goods rather than their owners. In this
checkerboard commons, composed of alternating public-domain
countries and private-ownership countries, the challenge concerns not
so much the sheer length of copyrights as the inconsistency of national
copyright rules. In the example of a copyright anticommons discussed
above, the source of underuse was multiple ownership interests created
in an unpublished novel by the laws of a single country. In the example
of Finnegans Wake, by contrast, the source of underuse takes the
geographical form of multiple national laws that impede global
dissemination. This uncoordinated commons thus poses a problem not
of owners’ gridlock but of users’ paralysis. The problem is not
uncooperative owners unable to aggregate decision-making under a
single country’s laws but rather willing users frustrated by mismatched
national laws.
A. The Disharmonizing Rule of the Shorter Term
When a work’s copyright has expired in its country of origin, it is
natural for those who wish to make use of the work to wonder whether
See Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 34, at 7.
The lack of international copyright harmony, despite legislators’ claimed intentions, has been
noted by many scholars. E.g., Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law:
Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 439–42
(2004).
56 See HELLER, supra note 14, at 188 (discussing examples of a sequential anticommons).
57 See id. at 3–4, 20–21; see also MITCHELL, supra note 21, at 77–78 (offering an example of a
sequential commons).
58 Geo-blocking technologies may be used to confine Internet distribution to public-domain
countries exclusively, but such a strategy only highlights the checkerboard nature of the global
commons. See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Issues: Which Country’s Law Applies When
Works are Made Available over the Internet?, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 53 (2010) (“[I]t might
be desirable [for libraries making materials available over the Internet to] . . . block access from
. . . [copyright] jurisdictions by anticipation. This approach is possible because one can slice and
dice the Internet geographically.”).
54
55
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they may distribute it in other countries where copyright terms are
longer. Will those countries recognize the work’s origin-country status
and treat it as public-domain, or will they apply their own rules and
deem the work to be protected? The Berne Convention’s rule of the
shorter term was adopted to provide solutions to such coordination
problems.59 The rule was fashioned, in part, to bring harmony to
divergent copyright durations in the global market.60 But if Berne’s goal
was to encourage worldwide application of a harmonizing rule, the goal
has been eroded by competing policies. For example, member states of
the European Union, which recognizes a general principle of nondiscrimination among E.U. members, may not apply the rule in a way
that “discriminates on the basis of a claimant’s home law.” 61 The
language of certain E.U. harmonization directives also suggests that the
rule of the shorter term should not be invoked as between E.U. member
states.62
A recent dispute over unauthorized exploitation in Spain of works
by the English writer G.K. Chesterton (1874-1936) illustrates the
harmony-defeating approach to the rule of the shorter term in the
European Union. A Spanish publishing house began issuing
Chesterton’s works in Spain after they had entered the public domain in
the United Kingdom, the works’ country of origin, at the end of 2006,
seventy years after the author’s death. For authors of Chesterton’s
vintage, however, the copyright term in Spain is the author’s life plus
eighty years.63 The Spanish publisher evidently acted in the belief that
Chesterton’s works would be deemed unprotected in Spain, pursuant to
the Berne Convention’s rule of the shorter term. After lengthy litigation,
the Spanish Supreme Court concluded that Chesterton’s works, like
See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
See Elizabeth Townsend Gard, In the Trenches with § 104A: An Evaluation of the Parties’
Arguments in Golan v. Holder as it Heads to the Supreme Court, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
199, 209–210 (2011) (noting that the rule was adopted to apply upward pressure on national
copyright terms in the interests of international harmony); see also CONCISE EUROPEAN
COPYRIGHT LAW 38 (Thomas Dreier et al. eds., 2006) (stating that the rule of the shorter term
was intended to “mitigate” the problem of “the same work [being] protected in different countries
for different periods of time”); cf. BRIGGS, supra note 53, at 320 (noting that the rule as originally
adopted allowed countries to cease recognizing rights in a work “after the country of origin has
shown, by terminating its own protection, that it considers the claims of the work to have been
satisfied”).
61 See Paul Edward Geller, Zombie and Once-Dead Works: Copyright Retroactivity after the E.C.
Term Directive, 18 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 7, 9 (2000); see also CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT
LAW, supra note 60, at 38–39 (noting that the E.U. non-discrimination principle precludes
application of the rule of the shorter term among E.U. members).
62 See Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 44 pmbl. ¶ 24 (“[C]omparison of terms should not result
in Member States being brought into conflict with their international obligations.”); see also
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2006 on the
Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, pmbl. ¶ 23, 2006 O.J. (L. 372)
(same) [hereinafter Directive 2006/116/EC].
63 See Intellectual Property Law art. 6 (Jan. 10, 1879, no. 12, at 107) (Spain).
59
60
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those of all authors who died between 1879 and 1986, were protected in
Spain for eighty years after the author’s death because the E.U.’s
principle of non-discrimination prohibited application of the Berne rule
to the prejudice of another E.U. member and its authors.64 In effect, an
uncoordinated public domain—with the Spanish copyright term
exceeding other E.U. copyright terms by ten years—will continue to
exist in the European Union for the works of many authors who died
before 1987.65
The E.U. harmonization directives require E.U. countries to apply
the rule of the shorter term to works of non-European origin,66 but
application of the rule can be unpredictable in that context as well. A
recent copyright lawsuit over short stories by the American author J.D.
Salinger (1919-2010) provides an illustration.67 After concluding that
three of Salinger’s stories, published in the 1940s, had entered the U.S.
public domain when their copyrights were not renewed pursuant to
earlier U.S. renewal requirements,68 a Tennessee publisher arranged to
reprint the stories in the United States. The Salinger estate grudgingly
conceded the propriety of U.S. publication but objected when it learned
that the publisher had also made arrangements to issue the stories in
translation in various countries of Europe.69 In March 2015, the
publisher filed a declaratory-judgment action in a Tennessee federal
court, seeking judicial clarification that the stories were in the public
domain in the European Union as a result of the Berne Convention’s
rule of the shorter term.70 The publisher contended that because the
stories were in the public domain in the United States—the country of
origin—E.U. countries would apply the rule to disregard their own
longer copyright terms (seventy or eighty years after Salinger’s death)71
and instead recognize the shorter U.S. term (twenty-eight years from the

See S.T.S., Apr. 13, 2015 (J.T.S., No. 177) (Spain), available at http://kluwercopyright
blog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2015/05/Chesterton.pdf.
65 Spain’s 1879 law was repealed in 1987 by a law that prospectively changed the copyright term
to the author’s life plus sixty years. See Intellectual Property Law art. 26 (B.O.E. Nov. 17, 1987).
The 1987 law was in turn repealed after the E.U. harmonization directive required a term of the
author’s life plus seventy years. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
66 See Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 44, art. 7, Directive 2006/116/EC, supra note 62, art. 7,
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW,
AND PRACTICE § 8.3.3, at 298–99 (3d ed. 2013).
67 See Devault-Graves Agency LLC v. Salinger, No. 2:2015cv02178-STA-tmp., 2015 WL
6143153 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2015).
68 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978)
(providing for an optional renewal copyright term of twenty-eight years after the initial twentyeight-year term).
69 Amended Declaratory Action & Complaint for Damages, ¶¶ 34-39, Devault-Graves Agency
LLC v. Salinger, (No. 1:15cv-0458-JL), 2015 WL 6143153 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2015).
70 See Amended Declaratory Action & Complaint for Damages, ¶¶ 45-48, Devault-Graves, 2015
WL 6143513, at *8-9.
71 See supra notes 63–65; see also infra note 92 and accompanying text.
64
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year of the stories’ first publication, with no renewal term).72
In its motion to dismiss, the Salinger estate raised doubts about
whether all E.U. countries would apply the rule of the shorter term to
these facts. The estate argued that application of the rule, far from being
automatic among Berne countries, often gives way to countervailing
national principles that override the rule in a given country, including
the country’s interpretation of the rule and its Berne obligations, the
country’s own copyright laws, and any copyright treaties between the
country and the origin country.73 The estate attached to its motion a
judgment it had recently obtained in which a German court ruled against
the Tennessee publisher’s German licensee and concluded that
Salinger’s three stories should not be treated to the rule of the shorter
term in Germany.74 In addition to noting that the stories still enjoyed
protection under German law’s interpretation of Berne, the German
court held that a bilateral treaty of 1892, guaranteeing U.S. authors the
same copyright treatment as German authors under German law,
rendered the rule of the shorter term inapplicable to Salinger’s three
stories in Germany, despite their public-domain status in the United
States.75
The Salinger estate also pointed to a recent case, Warner Bros.
Entertainment Italia v. Passworld,76 in which an Italian court refused to
apply the rule of the shorter term to older American-made cartoons that
had entered the U.S. public domain in the 1950s and 1960s for failure to
meet copyright renewal requirements. First, the Italian court cited an
1892 U.S.-Italy copyright treaty that, according to the court, conferred
protection on the cartoons in Italy and precluded the operation of the
rule of the shorter term.77 Second, the court ruled that Italian law would
not apply the rule to works that had entered the public domain of their
origin country as a result of that country’s copyright formalities.
Because the Berne Convention abolishes formalities (such as renewal)

See Amended Declaratory Action & Complaint for Damages, ¶¶ 44–49, Devault-Graves, 2015
WL 6143513, at *8–9. For the renewal term, see Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§
23–24, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
73 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, at 10–16, DevaultGraves, 2015 WL 6143513 (W.D. Tenn. May 22, 2015). The court granted the defendants’
motion with respect to lack of personal jurisdiction, denied the motion on all other issues, and
transferred the action to the U.S. District for the District of New Hampshire for further
proceedings. See Devault-Graves, 2015 WL 6143513 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2015). The plaintiff
later voluntarily dismissed the action. See Rule 41 Notice of Dismissal, Devault-Graves, 2015
WL 6143513 (D.N.H. Dec. 11, 2015).
74 Salinger v. Piper Verlag GmbH, Landgericht Berlin [BerLG] [Regional Court of Berlin] Mar.
31, 2015 (Ger.).
75 See id. at 10–11.
76 See Trib. Milan, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of Milan, 6 Febbraio 2013, Annali
italiani di diritto d’autore, della culture e dello spettacolo 901 (2013) (It.).
77 See id. at 910.
72
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as a condition of copyright protection,78 Warner Brothers’ failure to
renew the cartoon copyrights, resulting in irreversible loss of protection
in the United States, could not serve as a basis for applying the rule of
the shorter term in Italy.79 The court’s implication was that Berne
countries should not dignify the copyright-defeating formalities of other
countries by applying the rule to those shorter terms, but instead should
invoke, as an international corrective, a rule of national treatment that
might not be applied had the copyrights expired in the origin country for
reasons unrelated to formalities.80
These cases show that the rule of the shorter term is part of the
tragedy of the uncoordinated global public domain. The rule is often a
dead or moribund letter that offers little certainty for the prospective
disseminator of a work whose copyright has terminated in its country of
origin. As noted above, the United States sometimes does not apply the
rule even when foreign works are in the public domain in their origin
countries.81 E.U. member states are prohibited from applying the
shorter-term rule among themselves.82 Courts in Berne countries may
decide not to apply it to the public-domain works of other countries if
any of a number of principles or policies counsel otherwise.83 In short,
application of the rule is far from lucid, uniform, and harmonizing in
international contexts. Once again, we see tragic legal gridlock enacted
on the stage of geography, a confusing array of interpretive principles
that renders the rule of the shorter term a participant in the
transjurisdictional muddle. Here, the disabling fragmentation of the
world’s commons is exacerbated by uncertainty about whether a work,
already subject to conflicting national copyright terms, will be treated as
protected or unprotected in a given country under the shorter-term rule.
B. Uncoordinated Subsidiary Copyright Rules
The world’s public domains can be fragmented from above or
See Berne Convention (Paris Text), art. 5(2), July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 22.
See Warner Bros. Entm’t Italia, at 911; cf. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 1e civ., Dec. 17, 2009, Bull. civ. I, No. 07-21115 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021511566&fastReqI
d=1303403627&fastPos=1 (holding that the American film His Girl Friday, in the U.S. public
domain for failure to renew the copyright, is protected in France pursuant to Berne’s rejection of
formalities as a basis for copyright protection).
80 Because E.U. Directive 2006/116/EC, art. 7, and the Berne Convention, art. 18, refer to the
termination of copyright in shorter-term countries as “expiry,” it can be argued that those
instruments do not interpret the loss of copyright through noncompliance with formalities as
natural “expiry.” See Dorothy Schrader, Copyright Restoration for Public Domain Works, in
COPYRIGHT: CURRENT ISSUES AND LAWS 35 (John V. Martin ed., 2002) (noting the view that
Berne’s term “expiry” refers to “expiration of the full copyright term—not a term shortened by
failure to satisfy a formality prohibited by [Berne]”).
81 See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 66–80 and accompanying text.
78
79
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from below. That is, regulatory disharmony can result either from laws
that expand authors’ protections without regard for global uniformity or
from subsidiary copyright rules, such as user-benefiting limitations and
exceptions to owners’ rights, that are implemented by countries in a
unilateral, uncoordinated manner. A notorious example of
disharmonized subsidiary rules is the disparity between the fair use
doctrine in the United States84 and the fair dealing exception as codified
and interpreted in the United Kingdom.85 Fair dealing has typically
permitted only certain enumerated uses, such as limited copying for
research and study, criticism, review, and news reporting,86 and often is
held not to apply to unpublished works.87 In contrast, the fair use
provision in U.S. law prescribes an open-ended, multifactor test that
may apply to any copyrightable subject matter and expressly permits
reasonable uses of unpublished works.88 Commentators have noted that
fair use in the United States, which federal courts have interpreted
broadly to cover many “transformative” purposes,89 is inconsistent with
more restrictive laws and international agreements that constrain
judicial approaches in other countries.90 A biographer whose quotation
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 29–30 (Eng.).
86 See id.; see also Lior Zemer, Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright
Dominion and the Case of Fair Use, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1071–72 (2011) (noting the
“jurisdictional differences” between judicial interpretations based on fair use and those based on
fair dealing, and “the difficulty with international harmonization of a workable toolkit for fair use
incidents”). The U.K. copyright statute was recently amended to include fair dealing for purposes
of caricature, parody, or pastiche, and for limited quotation from a work previously made
available to the public. See The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody)
Regulations, 2014, SI 2014/2356, ¶¶ 3–5 (Eng.) (amending Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, c. 48, § 30 (Eng.)). Some nations, such as Israel, have adopted an open-ended, multifactor
test for fair dealing that resembles the U.S. approach. See Copyright Act 2007, 5768-2007, 2007
LSI 34 (Isr.); see also Zemer, supra (discussing legislative revision of Israel’s fair dealing law).
In Canada, courts have recently applied the fair dealing statute in a flexible manner reminiscent of
U.S. fair use. E.g., CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 379
(Can.), available at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scccsc/en/item/2125/index.do?r=AAAAA
QATQ2FuYWRhIEV2aWRlbmNlIEFjdAE. While the Republic of Ireland has considered the
adoption of “fair use” principles in its copyright law, the recommending committee stressed that
the proposed revisions were “very circumspect” and “differ[ed] substantially from the US
doctrine.” MODERNISING COPYRIGHT: THE REPORT OF THE COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMM. 11
(2013), http://www.cearta.ie/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CRC-Report.pdf.
87 See PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC
BATTLE 137–38 (2014); see also JENNIFER DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 61 (4th ed.
2012) (“It is generally held not to be fair dealing for an unpublished work to be the subject of
public criticism or review . . . .”).
88 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
89 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–80 (1994) (defining transformative
use in fair use determinations); Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L.
REV. 815, 818–39 (2015) (tracing the development of transformativeness in judicial fair use
analysis).
90 See Paul Edward Geller, How to Practice Copyright Law Internationally in Perplexing Times?,
60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 167, 175–76 (2013); cf. BALDWIN, supra note 87, at 312
(discussing the difference between U.S. fair use and the 2001 E.U. Information Society Directive,
84
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of copyrighted material would be deemed a transformative fair use in
the United States might have cause for concern that her work would be
subject to a more stringent standard in the United Kingdom and other
countries.
A striking example of uncoordinated subsidiary rules can be found
in certain reliance-party exceptions that were adopted in Britain and the
Republic of Ireland after a directive required E.U. countries to
harmonize their copyright terms. In 1993, the Council of the European
Communities issued a directive mandating harmonization of copyright
terms throughout the European Economic Community for the benefit of
authors and the first two generations of their descendants.91 The
directive required member countries to implement, by July 1, 1995, a
term of protection equal to the life of the author plus seventy years. 92
This requirement of upward harmonization restored to copyright many
works that had entered E.U. public domains after their previous term of
the author’s life plus fifty years had expired. Long-dead authors whose
copyrights were revived included Arthur Conan Doyle, F. Scott
Fitzgerald, Thomas Hardy, Rudyard Kipling, Edith Warton, Virginia
Woolf, and James Joyce.93
Recognizing the impact that upward harmonization might have on
individuals who had relied on the previous public-domain status of
revived works, the directive’s drafters permitted E.U. members to
implement local exceptions for such reliance parties. 94 But the directive
did not dictate the kinds of exceptions that might be adopted or require
uniformity in their implementation. The United Kingdom, for example,
adopted a number of exceptions that included a broad compulsory
license for anyone wishing to make use of a work whose copyright had
been revived by British legislation implementing the European
Council’s harmonization directive.95 In 1997 the James Joyce estate,
objecting to an unauthorized edition of the recently copyright-revived
Ulysses,96 sought a preliminary injunction in the English High Court
which “was commonly interpreted to rule out [quotation from] unpublished works”); Trimble,
supra note 29, at 346–47 (discussing variations among national exceptions for online posting of
photographs of public sculpture).
91 See Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 44, pmbl. ¶ 5.
92 See id. art. 1.
93 See Clive Reynard, The Impact of the European Directive on Inexpensive Reprint Editions, in
TEXTUAL MONOPOLIES: LITERARY COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 45, 49–51 (Patrick
Parrinder et al. eds., 1997).
94 See Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 44, pmbl. ¶ 27.
95 See Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995, SI 1995/3297, arts.
24–25 (Eng.). Article 23 exempts from liability, inter alia, any use of a revived-copyright work
where the use was completed before the date of revival (July 1, 1995) or where arrangements for
the use were completed before that date. See id. art. 23. The broad compulsory license in Articles
24 and 25 contains none of these limitations.
96 See JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES: A READER’S EDITION (Danis Rose ed., 1997) (originally
published 1922).

SPOO ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

1/18/2017 12:55 PM

126

[Vol. 35:107

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

against scholar Danis Rose who had prepared the edition, and the
edition’s publisher. The defendants were able to defeat some of the
estate’s claims by pointing to the British compulsory license. 97 That
license eliminated the need for the estate’s permission for most of the
edition and required only that the publisher arrange for payment of a
reasonable royalty on copies sold.98
The Republic of Ireland also adopted reliance-party exceptions to
help ease the impact of revived copyrights. However, these exceptions
did not include anything comparable to the compulsory license that
existed under British law.99 When the Joyce estate filed a similar action
in Ireland in 2000,100 the Irish High Court granted a preliminary
injunction preventing an Irish university press from publishing extracts
of Rose’s Ulysses edition in an anthology of Irish writing.101 The court
ruled that factual questions as to whether the edition met the detailed
requirements of the Irish reliance-party exceptions required a full
hearing.102 Thus, as a result of unharmonized national exceptions to the
E.U. harmonization directive, a scholarly edition of Ulysses that had
been conceived when that work lay in multiple E.U. public domains but
not published until after the revival of its copyright there, was subjected
to inconsistent judgments in Ireland and Britain.
This divergence between Ireland’s and Britain’s reliance-party
provisions reveals a critical aspect of the fragmented global commons:
Exceptions that are intended to lessen the impact of upward
harmonization or other rights-enhancing legislation are sometimes
rendered local by uncoordinated national implementation.103 This is an
See Sweeney v. MacMillan Publishers Ltd. [2001] EWHC (Ch) 460 (Eng.), http://www.bailii.
org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2001/460.html.
98 See id.
99 See European Communities (Term of Protection of Copyright) Regulations 1995 (SI 158/1995)
§ 14 (Ir.). Section 14(b) exempts from liability, inter alia, any use of a revived-copyright work
where the use was begun before the date of revival (July 1, 1995) or where substantial
preparations for the use were made before that date, and where the user was unaware of or did not
reasonably suspect the revival of the work’s copyright. See id. § 14(b). No compulsory license for
uses of revived-copyright works is provided for.
100 See Sweeney v. Nat’l Univ. of Ir. Cork [2001] 1 ILRM 310 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), http://
www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2000/70.html.
101 See IRISH WRITING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A READER (David Pierce ed., 2000).
102 See Sweeney v. Nat’l Univ. of Ir. Cork [2001] 1 ILRM 310. Cork University Press decided to
avoid further litigation and printed the anthology with the Joyce extracts omitted and a blank page
inserted bearing the notice, “[p]ages 323–346 have been removed due to a dispute in relation to
copyright.” IRISH WRITING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 101, at 323–46.
103 For example, although the 2001 E.U. Information Society Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 5 2001 O.J. (L 167)
(EC)) gave E.U. countries the option to enact limitations and exceptions to the directive, “[m]ost
States have stuck to their national traditions—some allowing multiple and broad limitations,
others only relatively few and narrow. This has left Europe with a patchwork of incompatible
limitations and exceptions, causing legal uncertainty to the detriment of commercial providers of
cross-border services, such as online music stores, and of cultural institutions, such as libraries,
97

SPOO ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

2016]

THE UNCOORDINATED PUBLIC DOMAIN

1/18/2017 12:55 PM

127

erosion of the global public domain from below, a failure to coordinate
commons-balancing subsidiary rules. While gridlock of the more
familiar anticommons variety results from the difficulty of aggregating
multiple ownership pieces within the same resource, this form of
gridlock arises from multiple nations’ failure to enact uniform
exceptions that would allow users of a resource to avoid liability in
international contexts.104 On the one hand, users are confined to those
countries that have enacted adequate exceptions and thus have too little
geographic space in which to make robust use of works (a problem that
resembles the effects of a spatial anticommons). On the other hand,
users enjoy substandard and confusing privileges in the global context
(a disability reminiscent of a legal anticommons).105
C. Sound Recordings in the United States
Another kind of uncoordinated commons is localized within the
United States. U.S. copyright law does not govern sound recordings
created before February 15, 1972, but instead cedes protection of those
works to “the common law or statutes of any State . . . until February
15, 2067.”106 Thus, any pre-1972 sound recordings, including those of
foreign origin, may be protected in the United States until 2067 in
whatever manner the individual states prescribe.107 These laws differ
widely as to theory of liability and sometimes even duration of
protection.108 For example, a California statute provides that, in that
state, the author of a pre-1972 sound recording “has an exclusive
ownership therein until February 15, 2047.”109 In contrast, New York
archives and public broadcasters, offering content across European borders.” Hugenholtz &
Okediji, supra note 34, at 27.
104 “Differences in the nature of the transitional provisions adopted by each country [in response
to the 1993 E.U. harmonization directive] are regrettable [and] produce further possible trade
barriers within the European Economic Area.” Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently, Balance and
Harmony in the Duration of Copyright: The European Directive and its Consequences, in
TEXTUAL MONOPOLIES: LITERARY COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 15, 23 (Patrick
Parrinder et al. eds., 1997).
105 See HELLER, supra note 14, at 159–60 (discussing spatial and legal anticommons).
106 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1976).
107 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 263–65 (N.Y. 2005)
(holding that sound recordings originally fixed and now in the public domain in Britain are
protected by New York common law until February 15, 2067); see also Flo & Eddie, Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding on summary judgment
that under New York law, owners of common-law copyrights in pre-1972 sound recordings have
an exclusive right of public performance).
108 See Gary Pulsinelli, Happy Together? The Uneasy Coexistence of Federal and State
Protection for Sound Recordings, 82 TENN. L. REV. 167, 169 (2014) (discussing the potentially
disharmonizing impact on interstate commerce and broadcasting of a proposed Tennessee bill that
would grant pre-1972 sound recordings the same protections that post-1972 sound recordings
enjoy throughout the United States under federal copyright law).
109 Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(2) (West 2015); see also Flo & Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc.,
No. CV 13–5693 PSG, 2014 WL 4725382, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (citing Cal. Civ. Code
§ 980(a)(2) and the date of February 15, 2047, in describing the scope of rights granted to pre-
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law protects the same sound recording for twenty years longer, until
February 15, 2067.110
Courts of the various states are also free to adopt inconsistent
definitions of “publication” for sound recordings—a critical concept for
determining infringement liability—and may even conclude, as one
court has done, that “the public sale of a sound recording otherwise
unprotected by statutory copyright does not constitute a publication
sufficient to divest the owner of common-law copyright protection.”111
As Peter Jaszi and his colleagues have shown in their survey of ten
states,112 pre-1972 sound recordings enjoy conflicting protection under a
variety of state criminal antipiracy statutes, civil statutes, and commonlaw doctrines of copyright, unfair competition, misappropriation, and
conversion. Moreover, from state to state, there is little harmony among
rules that provide exemptions and defenses for users. 113 Federal and
state courts have even disagreed over whether federal safe harbors that
limit infringement liability for Internet service providers114 apply to pre1972 sound recordings.115
Protection for pre-1972 sound recordings in the fifty states thus
creates another form of regulatory gridlock: a dizzying array of
mismatched laws, doctrines, and exemptions116 that threatens to
interfere with nationwide uses of these works.117 This nationwide
1972 sound recordings in California).
110 See Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 263.
111 Id. at 264.
112 See Peter Jaszi & Nick Lewis, Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Under State Law
and Its Impact on Use by Nonprofit Institutions: A 10-State Analysis, NAT’L RECORDING
PRESERVATION BOARD (2009), http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/reports/pub146/contents.html.
113 See id. at 2–22.
114 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010).
115 Compare UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Group, Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106, 111–12
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (holding that the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) does not apply to
pre-1972 sound recordings), with Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627,
640–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the DMCA safe harbors apply to pre-1972 sound
recordings).
116 See P. Dylan Jensen, Note, The Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Landscape: A Need for a
Uniform Federal Copyright Scheme, 38 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 273, 275 (2016) (noting
that “a web of varying state and common laws protect” pre-1972 sound recordings, “making it
nearly impossible for rights holders and sound recording users to understand the scope of
protection available”); see also Liu, supra note 28, at 1403 n.46 (describing inconsistent
protection for pre-1972 sound recordings as “a patchwork of state laws”).
117 See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[I]f different states adopt varying regulatory schemes for pre-1972 sound recordings, or if
holders of common law copyrights insist on licensing performance rights on a state-by-state basis
. . . it could upend the analog and digital broadcasting industries.”). A similar geographic muddle
exists with respect to state publicity-rights laws that protect commercial use of names, likenesses,
and images of deceased personalities. For example, New York does not recognize posthumous
publicity rights at all. See N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51; James v. Delilah Films, Inc., 144
Misc. 2d 374, 377–78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). In Indiana and Oklahoma, publicity rights for
deceased personalities subsist for 100 years after death. See IND. CODE § 32-36-1-8(a) (2016);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1448(G) (1998). Even Indiana’s and Oklahoma’s publicity rights differ
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congestion has international implications. Just as with the confusing
rule of the shorter term, a sound recording may have entered the public
domain of its foreign country of origin (for example, Britain), yet may
still be protected under state law in the United States,118 thus falling
victim to uncoordinated rules in both national and international
contexts. Moreover, it is possible that a musical composition performed
on a sound recording will have entered the U.S. public domain with the
expiration of its federal copyright, while the sound recording that
embodies the performance remains protected under the laws of some or
many states.119 Adding to the potential confusion, U.S. copyright law
has restored federal copyright protection to certain pre-1972 foreign
sound recordings, while leaving state-law protection untouched for pre1972 U.S. sound recordings.120 Sound recordings in the United States
are thus subject to a “jigsaw puzzle”121 of commons and private
ownership, federal and state-law variations, and enigmatic rules applied
to international contexts—a resource that is difficult for potential users
to understand and exploit. The law of sound recordings is a
geographical maze that offers a foretaste of the equally bewildering
problem of the uncoordinated global public domain of unpublished
works, to which I turn next.
II. GLOBAL DISHARMONY AND THE UNPUBLISHED PUBLIC DOMAIN
The preceding Part highlighted three aspects of the uncoordinated
public domain: the failure of the rule of the shorter term to harmonize
copyright terms; the conflicts among subsidiary copyright rules
purportedly created to benefit users of works; and the unassembled
jigsaw puzzle of state laws governing sound recordings in the United
States. In each case, legal disharmony, spread over multiple
jurisdictions, impedes the efforts of users to make unauthorized use of
works in global or multistate contexts. What multiple ownership rights
in a single resource are to an anticommons, single ownership,
distributed inconsistently over multiple jurisdictions, is to the
uncoordinated public domain. The map of quarrelling laws hinders
from each other in important respects. The scope of publicity rights in Indiana includes “gestures”
and “mannerisms,” whereas Oklahoma’s publicity-rights statute does not mention these indicia of
personality. See IND. CODE § 32-36-1-6. Moreover, Oklahoma’s statute does not protect
personalities who died before 1936. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1448(H) (1998). Indiana’s statute
appears to contain no such limitation. Therefore, Oklahoma’s favorite son, Will Rogers, who died
in 1935, receives publicity-rights protection in Indiana (including, presumably, protection for his
famous mannerism of slouching and rubbing his chin), but none at all in his native state.
118 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 263–65 (N.Y. 2005).
119 See Liu, supra note 28, at 1403 n.46.
120 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C)(ii) (2002); Adam P. Segal, Zombie Copyrights: Copyright
Restoration Under the New § 104A of the Copyright Act, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 71, 83 (1997).
121 See HELLER, supra note 14, at 176.
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broad dissemination of an expressive resource, despite the availability
of universal sharing technologies.122 The checkerboard effect of national
laws—a public-domain country here, a copyright country there—
subjects resources such as novels, films, sound recordings, and artworks
to underuse or obstruction, in the absence of often unforthcoming
permissions from copyright owners.
The examples offered above, though diverse in subject matter,
largely involved published works. The unpublished public domain,
however, is particularly vulnerable to the paralyzing effects of the
uncoordinated public domain.123 This public domain is possibly the
largest, though perhaps the least visible, cultural resource in existence.
The quantity of materials collectively held in the world’s institutional
repositories is prodigious. For example, the Harry Ransom Center at the
University of Texas at Austin contains more than forty-two million
manuscripts, many of them never published before. 124 Cornell
University’s library boasts seventy million manuscripts.125 The
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University houses
several million manuscripts.126 The British Library owns around 150
million items.127 The National Archives and Records Administration
claims to store “approximately 10 billion pages of textual records; 12
million maps, charts, and architectural and engineering drawings; 25
million still photographs and graphics; 24 million aerial photographs;
300,000 reels of motion picture film; 400,000 video and sound
recordings; and 133 terabytes of electronic data.”128 These staggering
numbers do not include the untold documents that exist in private
hands.129 In 2003, when copyrights of unpublished works created by
See Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 34, at 37–38 (“Digital networks ensure that creative
works and knowledge goods are more easily, rapidly and efficiently distributed to diverse and
large populations world-wide, assuring that welfare benefits from access and use of knowledge
goods in one market will undoubtedly have important (and at times immediate) bearing on the
value of other users in distant markets.”).
123 See Reese, supra note 8, at 611 (“[A]n unpublished work in the public domain in the United
States may well remain protected by copyright law in other countries.”); Townsend Gard, supra
note 9, at 705 (“[T]here exists a great variance of the copyright terms for unpublished works
[throughout the world]. . . . [U]npublished works seem to be in great disharmony.”).
124 See The Manuscripts Collection, HARRY RANSOM CENTER, http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/
collections/manuscripts/info/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
125 See Peter B. Hirtle, Archives or Assets?, 66 AM. ARCHIVIST 235, 235–36 (2003).
126 See Christopher Klein, Yale’s Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library turns 50, BOSTON
GLOBE (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/travel/2013/04/06/yale-beineckerare-book-and-manuscript-library-turns/2Xq1xcahwCc8rNBrouTEqM/story.html.
127 See Collection Guides: Greek Manuscripts, BRITISH LIBRARY, http://www.bl.uk/collectionguides/greek-manuscripts (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
128 About
the National Archives of the United States, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/publications/general-info-leaflets/1-about-archives.html (last visited
Aug. 2, 2016).
129 Many important cultural documents are privately held and difficult to access. One scholar
notes that “[m]any manuscripts related to [Sherlock] Holmes are in private collections. For
example, in 2004, auction house Christie’s sold a lot containing over 150 letters and cards from
122
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authors anywhere in the world who died before 1933 terminated in the
United States,130 “probably the largest single deposit of material
[entered] the [U.S.] public domain in history: every letter, journal,
poem, short story, song, sketch, photograph, or painting that had never
been publicly distributed and whose author died no later than 1932
[became available].”131 Yet, as this Article shows, the contents of one
nation’s public domain are not necessarily available for unfettered use
in all nations. Legal disharmony ensures that many unpublished works
will remain condemned to some degree of underuse in the global
context.
The uncoordinated global public domain is vividly illustrated by a
current scholarly project that has been organized to collect and publish
the unpublished letters of James Joyce.132 Most of Joyce’s
posthumously published works, which include several collections of his
letters, will enjoy copyright protection, in the United States at least, for
many years to come.133 However, copyrights in Joyce’s many
unpublished letters, notes, and manuscripts expired in the United
States134 and many European countries135 at the end of 2011, seventy
years after his death. Nearly 2,000 unpublished letters by Joyce are
known to exist in some fifty-nine repositories in ten countries.136
Preparing this important collection requires the editors to locate the
original letters, to obtain copies or make transcriptions of them, and to
arrange, edit, and annotate them for eventual print and digital
publication. For many years, the Joyce estate has adamantly refused to
[Arthur] Conan Doyle to A.P. Watt to a private collector. . . . Since collections like these are
privately, and often anonymously, owned, research here could go no further.” Cattleya M.
Concepcion, The Adventure of the Elusive Postcard, 5 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 283, 288 (2015).
130 See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2010).
131 Reese, supra note 8, at 586; see also Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 688–91 (calling the
2003 legal change “an unimaginable expansion of the public domain”).
132 I am one of four lead editors of this project, for which there is a contract with Oxford
University Press. The others are William S. Brockman, Kevin J.H. Dettmar, and Michael Groden.
I confine my observations to objective legal issues concerning the project and to the documented
experiences of my coeditors.
133 The three major published volumes of Joyce’s letters enjoy copyright protection in the United
States for ninety-five years from the year of their first publication. See JAMES JOYCE, LETTERS OF
JAMES JOYCE (Stuart Gilbert et al. eds., 1957–1966); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1998, 2002). Thus,
these volumes will remain in copyright in the United States for decades to come. The copyright
term for these same volumes differs in other countries. See, e.g., Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C42, § 7(1) (Can.) (providing that copyright in a posthumously published literary work endures for
fifty years from the end of the year of publication); see also Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 706
(noting that the U.K. term for certain posthumous works is fifty years from the end of the year of
publication).
134 See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2010).
135 See Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 44 art. 1.
136 See The Joyce Calendar: Published, Unpublished, and Ungathered Correspondence by James
Joyce, HARRY RANSOM CENTER, http://norman.hrc.utexas.edu/jamesjoycechecklist/calendar.cfm
(last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
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permit publication of any of Joyce’s unpublished letters, citing family
privacy and contending that private letters are irrelevant for
understanding Joyce’s creative gifts.137 With the expiration of
copyrights, the legal barriers to publication in the United States and
Canada138 have fallen. As currently planned, the print edition of the
Joyce letters will be distributed in those two countries initially. Any
digital editions will also be confined initially to those two countries by
means of geo-blocking technology or other measures.139
This limited geographical scope is dictated by the uncoordinated
global public domain for Joyce’s unpublished works. The copyright
laws of several key countries continue to impede unauthorized
worldwide distribution of Joyce’s unpublished writings. For example,
his unpublished letters may not be exploited without authorization in
Australia, where copyrights in unpublished works are perpetual.140
Spain’s copyright term for works by many earlier authors, including
Joyce, is the author’s life plus eighty years, not the author’s life plus
seventy years, as in the rest of the European Union.141 Adding to this
complexity, the copyright law of the Republic of Ireland is thought to be
ambiguous about when, or indeed whether, copyrights terminate in
unpublished works.142 The largest obstacle to archive-based projects in
For the Joyce estate’s efforts to protect what Joyce’s grandson has called “the much abused
privacy of the Joyce family,” see Max, supra note 5, at 35–36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138 Copyrights in unpublished writings like those of Joyce had already expired in Canada by
2004. See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, § 7(4) (Can.); Reese, supra note 8, at 608–09;
Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 707.
139 See Publishing Agreement between Oxford University Press and William S. Brockman, Kevin
J.H. Dettmar, and Robert Spoo, Sept. 29, 2012 (on file with author).
140 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 33 ss 3 (Austl.) (providing that a literary, dramatic, or musical
work not published or otherwise made available to the public before the author’s death is
protected for seventy years from the year in which the work is first published, performed,
broadcast, or issued as recordings to the public); Reese, supra note 8, at 609; Townsend Gard,
supra note 9, at 708.
141 See supra notes 63–65, 92 and accompanying text.
142 The Irish law states, “[t]he copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or an
original database shall expire seventy years after the death of the author, irrespective of the date
on which the work is first lawfully made available to the public.” Copyright and Related Rights
Act 2000 (Act No. 28/2000) § 24 (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2000/act/28/
enacted/en/print. This language might be read to mean that the seventy-year term does not begin
to run until a work is made publicly available, rendering the copyright in an unpublished work
potentially perpetual. This implication is strengthened by Section 9 of the First Schedule to
Ireland’s Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 (relating to Transitional Provisions and
Savings). See Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Act No. 28/2000) (Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2000/act/28/enacted/en/print. In response to the need for
reform and clarification of many aspects of Irish copyright law, including its treatment of
unpublished works, the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise, and Innovation established a Copyright
Review Committee in May 2011. The Committee recommended, among other changes, that
Section 24 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000, and Section 9 of the First Schedule be
revised to eliminate the “potentially (and unintentionally) . . . perpetual term of protection for
works unpublished at the date of death of the author.” See MODERNISING COPYRIGHT, supra note
86, at 35. Disclosure: As a Board member of the National Library of Ireland (NLI) at the time, I
drafted, for submission to the Committee, proposed language for clarifying Section 24 and other
137
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Europe, however, is the copyright law of the United Kingdom, which
protects the unpublished writings of authors who died before 1969, such
as Joyce, until 2039.143 This striking departure from the rest of Europe,
where Joyce’s works mostly entered the public domain at the end of
2011, raises a significant barrier to disseminating his unpublished letters
in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—collectively, one of
the largest English-speaking markets in the world.144
The United Kingdom’s 2039 rule has created a substantial gap in
the European Community’s purported goal of harmonizing the region’s
copyright terms. So disruptive has the rule become for cultural
repositories and other constituencies that in 2013 Parliament granted the
British Secretary of State powers to reduce the anomalous 2039 term for
most unpublished works, including letters and other research materials,
with the goal of simplifying U.K. copyright law and encouraging the
publication of previously unpublished works.145 During a consultation
period, numerous organizations and individuals submitted their views
on the proposed term-reduction. Many cultural institutions that
collectively hold millions of unpublished works subject to the 2039
rule146 urged the government to exercise its term-reducing powers.
These institutions cited the negative impact of the rule on scholarly and
curatorial uses, the orphan works problem, the rights clearance process,
the objective of harmonizing copyright duration across the European
Union, and other cultural concerns.147

sections, on behalf of the NLI. As of this writing, Irish legislators have drafted but not yet enacted
legislation based on the Review Committee’s recommendations. See Proposed Copyright Law to
Improve Court Access and Create New Exemptions, IRISH LEGAL NEWS (Aug. 5, 2016),
http://www.irishlegal.com/4985/proposed-copyright-law-to-improve-court-access-and-createnew-exemptions/#.
143 See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 1, (12)(4) (Eng.) (amending Copyright
Act 1956, c. 74, § 2 (3)); see also U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICIAL CONSULTATION ON
REDUCING THE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT IN UNPUBLISHED (“2039”) WORKS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 170(2) OF THE COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS AND PATENTS ACT 1988, at 4–5 (2014)
(summarizing the 2039 rule); Reese, supra note 8, at 608; Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 707,
710–12 (describing the international disharmonizing effects of the 2039 rule).
144 See Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 705 (describing the difficulty of publishing or
distributing unpublished works in multiple countries where copyright laws may differ). It is true
that the “litigation difficulties” of enforcing copyright laws in cross-border contexts may
practically insulate many online infringing activities. See Trimble, supra note 29, at 390–401.
However, the uncoordinated public domain creates serious ex ante problems for researchers who
must deal with publishers, institutional repositories, and other gatekeepers.
145 See Enterprise & Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24, § 76(3) (Eng.) (amending the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988); see also U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICIAL
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION ON REDUCING THE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT
IN CERTAIN UNPUBLISHED WORKS 1 (2015) [hereinafter U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OFFICIAL RESPONSE] (summarizing the term-reducing powers enacted by Parliament),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399171/973__Governement_Response_-_copyright_in_certain_unpublished_works.pdf.
146 See U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 144, at 2.
147 See id. at 2–3.
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However, respondents who represented rights-holders argued that
altering the 2039 rule would amount to a confiscation of property rights,
depriving owners of income sources, licensing arrangements, and other
benefits, possibly in violation of European human rights principles.148
Other respondents expressed concern about the potential erosion of
individual privacy in letters, diaries, and other materials not ostensibly
created for publication.149 As a result of these protests, and despite the
many respondents who urged amendment of the rule, the British
government concluded that legislation should not be made “without
further consideration of the issues raised during the consultation,” and
that discussions with “interested parties” would be arranged “to explore
the possible direction of future work in this area.”150 The consequence
of this political tabling is that the 2039 rule remains an obstacle to many
scholarly and institutional undertakings.
A. Post-Copyright Copyrights in the European Union
The 2039 rule is not the only barrier to archive-based projects in
Europe. The same European Council directive that compelled the
upward harmonization of copyright terms in the 1990s contained an
additional provision:
Any person who, after the expiry of copyright protection, for the first
time lawfully publishes or lawfully communicates to the public a
previously unpublished work, shall benefit from a protection
equivalent to the economic rights of the author [for] 25 years from
the time when the work was first lawfully published or lawfully
communicated to the public.151

Countries throughout the European Union were required to adopt
this provision, which grants twenty-five years of economic copyright
protection—that is, copyright without moral rights152—to any person
who first lawfully publishes or makes available a work that has never
before been published and whose copyright has expired.153 On its face,
this provision appears to create a kind of first-come-first-served
monopoly. It was adopted as an incentive for making old, neglected
works available for the first time and to reward the disseminator’s
investment and sweat of the brow.154 Although this provision shares
See id. at 4, 11.
See id. at 8.
150 Id. at 11.
151 Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 44 art. 4, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9, 13 (EC).
152 For a description of moral rights, see infra notes 196–199 and accompanying text. See also
Reese, supra note 8, at 634 (noting that E.U. post-copyright rights “need not confer any moral
rights protection”).
153 See, e.g., Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Act No. 28/2000) § 34 (Ir.).
154 See MICHEL M. WALTER & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW: A
COMMENTARY § 8.4.16, at 573 (2010).
148
149
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features with other E.U. copyright revival rules,155 there is a significant
difference: An unpublished work no sooner enters the public domains of
the European Union than it can be restored to copyright by the first
industrious disseminator, not as an entitlement of the original author’s
estate, but as a new right vested in the disseminator.
These E.U. post-copyright copyrights create the possibility of an
unseemly land-rush and additional rights-layered gridlock. Almost
immediately after James Joyce’s unpublished writings had entered the
E.U. public domains, they became the subject of new copyright
controversies. In February 2012, the Irish Times reported that Ithys
Press, a small startup publisher based in Dublin, had announced the
publication of a previously unpublished letter written by Joyce to his
young grandson in 1936.156 This illustrated volume, titled The Cats of
Copenhagen, was offered for sale in editions priced at €1,200 and
€300,157 and was based on the original handwritten letter held in the
collections of the Zürich James Joyce Foundation. The Foundation lost
no time in complaining that it had been left “completely in the dark
about the publication and that it never permitted, tolerated, condoned or
connived in this publication.”158 Ithys Press made no attempt to deny
that it had published the volume without seeking the Foundation’s
permission, or that it was proclaiming itself the claimant of a new
twenty-five year E.U. copyright in the text of Joyce’s letter.
Then, in early April 2012, The House of Breathings, another new
entity based in the United States, announced that it was issuing The
Dublin Ulysses Papers, a six-volume edition of previously unpublished
Joyce materials that had been acquired by the National Library of
Ireland (NLI) some years before at a cost of millions of euros. 159 The
volumes could be obtained at prices between €75 and €200 each, the
complete set for €800.160 Danis Rose, the editor of the volumes, stated
that he had taken it upon himself to publish the NLI’s papers in order to
forestall others who might capture the E.U. after-rights for themselves

See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
See Terence Killeen, Joyce Children’s Story Published in Dublin to Dismay in Zürich, IRISH
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/joyce-children-s-story-published-indublin-to-dismay-in-z%C3%BCrich-1.459003.
157 See THE CATS OF COPENHAGEN James Joyce, ITHYS PRESS, https://ithyspress.wordpress.
com/titles/the-cats-of-copenhagen-james-joyce/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2016).
158 Killeen, supra note 156 (quoting the Zürich James Joyce Foundation).
159 See Press Release, National Library of Ireland’s James Joyce ‘Ulysses’ Papers, Edited and
Annotated by Danis Rose, Now Published in Six Volumes by House of Breathings (Apr. 4, 2012)
(on file with Danis Rose), http://joycemanuscriptsdublin.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/press
release_dublinulyssespapers_danisrose.pdf; Michael Groden, The National Library of Ireland’s
New Joyce Manuscripts: An Outline and Archive Comparisons, 14 JOYCE STUD. ANN. 5, 5
(2003) (noting that the NLI paid €12,600,000 for the Joyce manuscripts).
160 See Terence Killeen, Joyce Collection Published Free on Web, IRISH TIMES (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/joyce-collection-published-free-on-web-1.499482.
155
156
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and engage in “restrictive” practices.161 To show his good faith, he
declared himself a temporary trustee of the new rights, which he held
for the benefit of “[s]cholars, librarians, and artists,” and promised that
he would conclude his trusteeship by “mak[ing] over to the Irish State”
all such rights as he had acquired in the documents.162 Rose had not
obtained the permission of the NLI before announcing plans to publish
these materials.
A few days after this announcement, the NLI placed on its public
website numerous digital files containing images of most of the Joyce
manuscripts that had been announced for The Dublin Ulysses Papers,
along with other unpublished Joyce materials from its collections.163 In
doing so, the NLI was accelerating its plans for making the Joyce
materials digitally available to the public.164 Rose promptly responded
in the press by charging that the NLI had infringed his “copyright,”
adding that the NLI, in going forward with its online project, had in
effect “rejected” his “proposed gift” of the newly acquired rights to
Ireland.165 Thus, in the space of a few months, unpublished Joyce
documents had gone from being copyright-free throughout most of the
European Union to being the subject of competing monopoly claims.
Here was a true copyright anticommons166 in which the NLI and Danis
Rose both claimed post-copyright rights in the same resources
throughout most of the European Union. This anticommons was
compounded by an uncoordinated public domain inasmuch as the Joyce
estate still enjoyed original author-based copyrights in those resources
in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Australia,167 though not in the
United States,168 Canada,169 and Switzerland,170 where Joyce’s
unpublished writings had entered the public domain and were not
See Danis Rose, Preface to The Dublin Ulysses Papers by James Joyce (2012), http://houseof
breathings.com/about/.
162 See id.
163 See More Service Enhancements, NAT’L LIBR. OF IR., http://www.nli.ie/en/list/latest-news.
aspx?article=3f4bf22c-6dc8-4182-be71-4b09b9df84f2 (last visited Aug. 2, 2016); see also
Killeen, supra note 160. The Zürich James Joyce Foundation has also made available free, highquality online images of the letter from Joyce to his grandson that was published by Ithys Press.
See The Errant Copenhagen Letter, ZURICH JAMES JOYCE FOUND., http://www.joyce
foundation.ch/site/jahnke-bequest-2/the-copenhagen-letter-3/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
164 As a NLI Board member, I participated in the decision to make the digitized Joyce materials
available on the NLI’s website.
165 Danis Rose, A Question of Joyce Copyright (letter to the editor), IRISH TIMES (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/a-question-of-joyce-copyright-1.503145.
166 See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
170 See WALTER & LEWINSKI, supra note 154, § 8.1.4, at 515 n.46 (noting that copyrights that
had already expired in Switzerland pursuant to the term of the author’s life plus fifty years were
not revived by new Swiss legislation in 1993 that amended the term to the author’s life plus
seventy years).
161
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subject to post-copyright revival of any kind.
These post-copyright copyrights raise various questions that find
few answers in the present state of E.U. law. For example, what
constitutes an act of “publication” or “making available” sufficient for
acquiring the new right? Does a prospective announcement of plans to
publish trigger the right?171 Must first publication occur within the
European Economic Area for the new right to be validly acquired?172
How are conflicting claims of priority to be resolved? One reason that a
term of years running from the author’s death has been so widely
adopted as a formula for fixing the length of copyrights is that the
publication-plus calculus can lead to disputes over when and whether
publication actually occurred,173 particularly when the Internet is the
medium of distribution.174 These first-come-first-served copyrights
abandon this logic and make entitlements depend on elusive analog and
digital release dates, publishers’ announcements and recordkeeping, and
other disputable evidence of priority.
Moreover the question of who owns this new right is not settled in
all E.U. jurisdictions.175 Although the language of the harmonization
directive appears to vest the right in the first person to disseminate,
French law provides that the right belongs to the owners
(“propriétaires”) of the manuscript (“oeuvre”) who bring about the
publication or cause the publication to be made (“qui effectuent ou font
effectuer la publication”).176 This provision, which may partly reflect
French law’s sensitivity to the moral right of divulgation,177 seems to
confine the right, at least in the first instance, to the owners of original
manuscripts. In 1993, in a case involving certain unpublished

Irish law, at least, appears to require actual issuance of copies of the work to the public. See
Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Act No. 28/2000) § 40(1) (Ir.).
172 British regulations plainly state that it must. See The Copyright and Related Rights
Regulations 1996, SI 1996/2967, pt. II, ¶ 16(4)(a) (Eng.); see also WALTER & LEWINSKI, supra
note 154, at 669–70 (describing the requirements for obtaining post-copyright rights in the United
Kingdom); Reese, supra note 8, at 621 n.148 (noting that the provision for post-copyright rights
“does not appear to apply if the work is first published outside of the European Economic Area”).
173 See H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 129–30 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745–46
(discussing the “increasingly artificial and obscure” concept of publication as a means of marking
the beginning of copyright terms). Some copyright terms are still measured from the year of
publication. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1998) (providing that copyright terms for anonymous
and pseudonymous works and for works made for hire endure for ninety-five years from the year
of first publication).
174 See Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 698–701.
175 See WALTER & LEWINSKI, supra note 154, § 8.4.25, at 577 (“[W]ith regard to the related right
in posthumous works, initial ownership is not harmonized on the European level.”).
176 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. INTELL. PROP.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE] art. L. 123-4(3) (Fr.); see also WALTER & LEWINSKI, supra note 154, § 8.4.25, at 577
(“[O]wnership in posthumous works vests [under French law] in the proprietor of the ‘work’
(manuscript) . . . .”).
177 See BALDWIN, supra note 87, at 147–49 (discussing the development of the moral right of
divulgation in France).
171
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manuscripts of the nineteenth-century writer Jules Verne, a French court
held that post-copyright rights belonged to the city of Nantes, which had
acquired the original documents from Verne’s heirs, and not to a
biographer who had obtained copies and published their contents
without securing the city’s permission.178
The harmonization directive and various E.U. domestic laws also
provide that to qualify for these after-rights, the disseminator must
perform the act of publication “lawfully.” Because the right applies only
to works already in the public domain, the word “lawfully” can scarcely
mean, without redundancy or contradiction, “with the consent of the
author’s estate.” Some commentators believe that it means “with the
consent of the owner of the manuscript.”179 In 2003, a German court
ruled that publication by news outlets of photos of the recently
unearthed Bronze Age Nebra Sky Disk, without the consent of the
German state that owned the Disk, did not strip the state of its rights
under German copyright law.180 British regulations are explicit on this
point. They state that a claimed post-copyright right is invalid if it is
based on “an unauthorised act . . . done without the consent of the
owner of the physical medium in which the work is embodied or on
which it is recorded.”181 So, are these after-rights intended for finders
or for owners? If for finders, does E.U. law jeopardize the massive
investments of cultural repositories in unpublished documents and
invite the claims of opportunists who have somehow obtained copies of
those documents?182 If for owners, does the law in effect collapse
copyright law’s hard-won distinction between tangible property and
intangible rights, personalty and public goods?183 Is this law the best

See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 9, 1993, Bull.
civ. I, No. 319 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&
idTexte=JURITEXT000007031400&fastReqId=1005538594&fastPos=1; see generally Suzanne
Hovasse-Banget, La Titularité des Droits de Publication Posthume Relatifs aux Oeuvres Inédites
de Jules Verne, 7 REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L’OUEST 317 (1994), http://www.persee.fr/doc/
juro_0990-1027_1994_num_7_3_2158 (discussing the legal points and implications of the Jules
Verne case, and reproducing the text of the decision).
179 WALTER & LEWINSKI, supra note 154, § 8.4.20, at 575 (citing authority); see also Reese,
supra note 8, at 634 (discussing U.K. post-copyright rights).
180 See Himmelsscheibe von Nebra, Landgericht Magdeburg [LG] [Magdeburg Regional Court]
Oct. 16, 2003, 7 O 847/03 (Ger.), https://www.telemedicus.info/urteile/Urheberrecht/Editioprinceps/626-LG-Magdeburg-Az-7-O-84703-Himmelsscheibe-von-Nebra.html.
181 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996, SI 1996/2967, pt. II, ¶ 16(3) (Eng.). The Irish
Copyright Review Committee recommended that Section 34 of the Republic of Ireland’s
Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000, be amended to conform to British copyright regulations
on this point. See MODERNISING COPYRIGHT, supra note 86, at 36.
182 For a discussion of the challenges that E.U. post-copyright rights pose for cultural institutions,
see PETER WIENAND ET AL., A GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT FOR MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES 70–75
(2000).
183 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is
embodied.”).
178
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way to encourage institutions to make or allow productive use of their
holdings? And is it efficient to parcel out the public domain to new
owners in the absence of a method for alerting the public to the
existence of such ownership claims?184
This sampling of puzzles shows, once again, that E.U.
harmonization initiatives can be anything but harmonizing at the level
of local implementation. When we step back to view the world’s
copyright map, we see dramatic disharmonies everywhere. A work may
occupy the public domains of some or many countries, but it is often
simultaneously protected by copyrights or moral rights in other
countries. In still other countries, a work will have entered the public
domain for a time and then be restored to protected status, with
ownership vesting in the author’s estate, a first disseminator, or in a
cultural repository, depending on the governing law and the type of
work involved.185 In some cases the work may become the subject of
true anticommons congestion as multiple claimants wrangle over E.U.
post-copyright rights.186 When the goal of distribution is worldwide and
the technical means are available, as with the Joyce letters project and
similar undertakings, local tragedies can become global ones. The ripple
effects of local gridlock may impede global dissemination, even when a
work is free of legal restrictions throughout much of the rest of the
world.
Thus, a patchwork of divergent national laws has given rise to an
uncoordinated public domain, potentially condemning Joyce’s writings
to years of tragic underuse. Joyce-related copyrights will remain an
obstacle for the foreseeable future. That this may entail ongoing
gridlock rather than a temporary check on the global public domain—
true tragedy rather than mere transition187—is suggested by the
unpredictability of E.U. post-copyright rights, which unforeseen
claimants might assert at any time with respect to thousands of
unpublished Joyce writings, creating a bewildering array of temporally
staggered rights throughout the European Union and strewing the path
of researchers with hazard and uncertainty.
B. Cultural Repositories, Moral Rights, and Fearful Norms
Impeded distribution is one effect of the uncoordinated public
domain, but the patchwork global commons creates yet another
See Reese, supra note 8, at 660 (noting that users may not be able to rely on the publicdomain status of a work without investigating whether the post-copyright right has been
acquired).
185 See supra notes 171-184 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 39–42, 166 and accompanying text.
187 See HELLER, supra note 14, at 69–70; cf. Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 706 (noting that
transitional disharmony among some countries’ copyright terms for unpublished works will end
“in about fifty years”).
184
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obstacle, less visible perhaps to ordinary observers but no less
frustrating for those engaged in archival research: library policies
governing scholarly use of unpublished materials. Even after the
copyrights in such materials have expired according to the laws of some
or many countries, the policies and practices of cultural repositories,
wherever situated, may make it difficult for users to access and obtain
research copies of those materials.188 Whether from a desire to generate
revenue,189 to safeguard authors’ privacy,190 or to avoid perceived legal
dangers,191 repositories sometimes refuse to allow access to or copying
of such materials, even after the materials are no longer protected by
copyright.192 By continuing to privatize documents that have entered the
legal public domain, repositories may jeopardize “the general archival
mission of making the resources of the past accessible to the future,”
and effectively impose “quasi-copyright control” over uncopyrighted
materials.193 Because repositories are generally free to observe their
own informal norms for access and copying, 194 they threaten to replicate
or complicate the patterns of rule-fragmentation that already create legal
gridlock in the public domain.195
Some French repositories, for example, bar both access to and
copying of unpublished documents, and they do so even when those
documents lack copyright protection in France. Copyrights in James
Joyce’s unpublished letters expired in France, as in much of the
European Union, at the end of 2011.196 But in France, moral rights exist

See Townsend Gard, supra note 9, at 711 (“[E]ven without copyright, [unpublished] papers
may still be governed by other conditional access controls, and those who hold the papers will
yield [sic] a great deal of power, regardless of their legal rights.”).
189 See Michelle Light, Controlling Goods or Promoting the Public Good: Choices for Special
Collections in the Marketplace, 16 RBM: J. RARE BOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, & CULTURAL
HERITAGE, 48, 49–50, 56–57 (2015).
190 See BIELSTEIN, supra note 30, at 9; Sara S. Hodson, In Secret Kept, in Silence Sealed: Privacy
in the Papers of Authors and Celebrities, 67 AM. ARCHIVIST 194, 196–97 (2004).
191 See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
192 See Reese, supra note 8, at 617–21. Sometimes contractual conditions insisted on by donors
or sellers require repositories to limit access to or copying of uncopyrighted materials. See id. at
620–21; see also Lois More Overbeck, Researching Literary Manuscripts: A Scholar’s
Perspective, 56 AM. ARCHIVIST 62, 68 (1993) (urging archivists to cooperate with researchers
and not to place “excessive restriction on copying that needlessly hampers productive and careful
scholarship”).
193 See Hirtle, supra note 125, at 236, 240; cf. Jason Mazzone, COPYFRAUD, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1026, 1056–57 (2006) (arguing that it is wrong for repositories to assert a copyright interest in
materials in which they own only physical rights).
194 See Mazzone, supra note 193, at 1055–56.
195 See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CULTURAL TREASURES 119 (1999) (noting that “library practices vary enormously” in providing
access to and copies of unpublished materials); see also id. at 199 (urging libraries and museums
to “implement reasonable, identical basic rules for gifts [of cultural materials]” and to “enforce
common policies on embargoes and access”).
196 See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. INTELL. PROP.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE] art. L. 123-1 (Fr.).
188
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perpetually and are descendible.197 Moral rights, which protect authorial
reputation and dignity and are distinct from the limited economic rights
conferred by copyright law, include the right to be named the author of
a work (attribution), the right against mutilation of the work (integrity),
and the right to choose when and how to disclose the work to the public
(divulgation).198 Some French repositories have refused to allow
scholars to obtain research copies of or even to view Joyce’s letters
without his estate’s permission, citing the moral right of divulgation (le
droit de divulgation)199 that indefinitely protects Joyce’s (that is, his
heirs’) prerogative to choose the conditions for disclosing his
unpublished letters to the public, long after the copyrights have
expired.200 Moral rights “give [an author’s] descendants especially
powerful tools,”201 and these rights pose serious obstacles to archival
research and to public dissemination of materials.202
Whether a French repository is legally correct in extending the
divulgation right to private consultation by researchers is not entirely
clear,203 but as a practical matter this prohibition turns the repository
into an archival tomb when the consent of heirs cannot be obtained,
except in rare cases in which a court might determine that an heir has
committed notorious abuse (abus notoire) in using the divulgation right

See id. arts. L.L 121-1–121-2.
See Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and French
Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 434, 447 (1999) (discussing the judicial
origins of the French divulgation right); BALDWIN, supra note 87, at 28–37 (discussing the
various moral rights); Reese, supra note 8, at 609–610 (discussing France’s “apparently perpetual
and descendible” divulgation right).
199 See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. INTELL. PROP.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE] art. L. 121-2 (Fr.).
200 See, e.g., E-mail from Nathalie Fressard, Bibliothécaire assistante spécialisée, Bibliothèque
littéraire Jacques Doucet, Paris, France, to Kevin J.H. Dettmar, W.M. Keck Professor of English,
Pomona College (Feb. 5, 2015, 08:50 CST) (on file with author) (requiring estate permission for
consulting Joyce’s unpublished letters); E-mail from Laurence Le Bras, Service des manuscrits
modernes et contemporains, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris, France, to Kevin J.H.
Dettmar (Feb. 3, 2015, 09:26 PST) (on file with author) (stating that archival copies of Joyce’s
unpublished letters must be authorized by his estate, in light of moral rights). The Bibliothèque
littéraire Jacques Doucet extends the requirement of estate-authorized consultation to all its
manuscripts and letters. See Services au public, BIBLIOTHEQUE LITTERAIRE JACQUES DOUCET,
http://bljd.sorbonne.fr/Informations-pratiques/p8/Services-au-public (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
The divulgation right has been described as “the most restrictive [of the French moral rights] for
archives, and has aroused much anxiety regarding the meaning of the term divulgation in this
context.” CHRISTINE DE JOUX ET AL., LES ARCHIVES PRIVÉES: MANUEL PRATIQUE ET JURIDIQUE
161 (2008) (author’s translation).
201 Baldwin, supra note 87, at 38.
202 See Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 50 (“[I]f a U.S. archive makes a letter by a French author
accessible all over the world via the Internet, that author’s French divulgation rights are violated,
but so are they also in Germany, Spain and any other country that recognizes those rights.”).
203 See DE JOUX ET AL., supra note 200, at 161. At least one authority contends that, under
French law, consultation of materials by an individual researcher in an archival reading room
does not constitute divulgation in the sense of the Code De La Propriété Intellectuelle. See id.
197
198
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to block access.204 Notorious abuse is difficult to prove, because the
litigant often must show that the heir’s actions have been inconsistent
with what the deceased author would have wished, even if the author
never recorded her wishes or expressed a pertinent opinion.205 The
potentially eternal French divulgation right thus adds further fissures to
the fragmented global commons. The expiration of French copyright in
an unpublished work means little as long as the divulgation right
threatens to bar archival access, research copies, and general publication
and distribution, absent the consent of heirs who might prove resistant,
unresponsive, or difficult to locate.
It is unclear how much the restrictive policies of repositories
reflect reasonable interpretations of the law and how much they reflect
subjective institutional norms. Both formal and informal norms may be
operating when cautious interpretations of legal rules shape institutional
practices.206 When such interpretations reflect exaggerated caution, one
might say that institutional practices are governed by fearful norms. 207
See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. INTELL. PROP.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE] art. L. 121-3 (Fr.); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Conflicts of Copyright Ownership Between
Authors and Owners of Original Artworks: An Essay in Comparative and International Private
Law, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 395, 414–15 (1994) (discussing the divulgation right and the
exception for notorious abuse). Recently, a planned edition of the unpublished letters of the
French poet René Char to his mistress ran aground on the postmortem divulgation right. When
the poet’s widow, citing the divulgation right, objected to the edition, the editors sued her for
committing abus notoire. The litigation ran through several appeals before the editors were finally
enjoined from issuing their edition. See Louis Lefebvre, René Char et le Droit de Divulgation
Post Mortem, REVUE GÉNÉRALE DU DROIT (Dec. 2014), http://www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/
blog/2014/12/11/rene-char-et-le-droit-de-divulgation-post-mortem/ (discussing the Char case and
other cases involving the divulgation right).
205 See Lefebvre, supra note 204.
206 See KENNETH D. CREWS, COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE, AND THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIVERSITIES:
PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 119–22 (1993) (discussing librarians’
tendency to adopt strict policies regarding use of copyrighted works); cf. David R. Hansen et al.,
Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 10 (2013)
(“[M]any libraries and archives forgo socially beneficial uses of orphan works because of an
abundance of caution on the part of librarians and archivists who seek to avoid copyright
infringement and litigation.”). Wide variations among international copyright laws governing
library practices also contribute to global rule-fragmentation and disharmony for research
projects. For an overview of these laws, see generally KENNETH D. CREWS, WIPO STANDING
COMM. ON COPYRIGHT & RELATED RIGHTS, STUDY ON COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS FOR LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES: UPDATED AND REVISED (2015).
207 American repositories have applied widely varying policies to requests for photographic
research copies of James Joyce’s unpublished letters. The New York Public Library’s Berg
Collection refused to make or permit such copies of unpublished Joyce letters held in its archives,
absent estate permission or special undertakings, despite the fact that the letters are in the public
domain in the United States. To justify its refusal, the Berg Collection cited its concern that
copyright in Joyce’s unpublished letters still exists in certain European countries. See E-mail from
Isaac Gewirtz, Curator, Berg Collection, to William S. Brockman (July 18, 2014, 16:11 EST) (on
file with author). In contrast, the Fales Library at New York University promptly provided digital
copies of its unpublished Joyce letters upon written request and payment of a modest fee, with no
requirement of estate permission. See E-mail from Michael Groden, Distinguished University
Professor Emeritus, Western Univ., to William S. Brockman (Mar. 2, 2015, 13:29 CST) (on file
with author). Columbia University’s Butler Library has adopted an even more liberal policy,
204
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The danger is that fearful norms will further fragment the uncoordinated
public domain by informally replicating and even exacerbating, on the
level of private institutional decision-making, the general problem of
legal gridlock and resource underuse. In such cases, fearful norms
compound the “obstruction function”208 of copyrights by preventing
researchers from engaging in acts that may actually be permitted by the
law. Moreover, isolated and unappealable decisions by cultural
repositories may intensify the pronounced disparities that already exist
in the legal treatment of moral rights among European nations209 and
other nations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where
moral rights are recognized in more attenuated forms and for limited
purposes.210
The problem is especially acute for projects that envision broad
dissemination of materials sharing a common theme or subject matter,
such as a particular author’s collected writings. As E.U. post-copyright
rights show, uncoordinated acquisitions of rights can effectively
atomize authors’ oeuvres, dispersing them among multiple private
rights-holders and compounding the fragmentation effects of
inconsistent national laws.211 Analogous coordination problems arise
when physical collections of authors’ manuscripts are offered for sale.
The concern is that the dispersal of such papers or other unified
collections among multiple private purchasers will make it difficult for
researchers to locate and reassemble the scattered materials. 212 The
pieces of private ownership that are distributed around the world cannot
easily be gathered into accessible units that may be studied.213 The
relying on fair use and other exemptions to permit researchers to use their own cameras and other
devices to make research copies of materials consulted on site, including unpublished Joyce
letters. See E-mail from Karla Nielsen, Curator of Literature, Rare Book and Manuscript Library,
Columbia Univ., Butler Library, to Robert Spoo (Aug. 9, 2016, 09:58 CST) (on file with author).
Until 2004 or so, the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center in Texas required permissions
to be obtained before providing researchers with copies of copyrighted materials in its collections,
despite specific exemptions under U.S. copyright law that authorize such copying. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 108(e)) (2005). The Center has since conformed its policies to the law with respect to most
research copies. See E-mail from Richard Oram, Associate Director, Harry Ransom Humanities
Research Center, Univ. of Texas at Austin, to Robert Spoo (June 15, 2015, 15:56 CST) (on file
with author).
208 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda,
2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 148–49 (2011).
209 See BALDWIN, supra note 87, at 313–14 (discussing European lack of agreement on moral
rights).
210 See id. at 230–40.
211 See supra notes 151–185 and accompanying text.
212 See SAX, supra note 195, at 148–49 (discussing the cultural problems arising from
“[d]ispersal of important collections” by sale and auction).
213 The varying practices of repositories regarding unpublished manuscripts mirror, on an
institutional level, some of the access problems created by the dispersal of authors’ papers
through private sales. See supra notes 188–210 and accompanying text. In the case of the Dead
Sea Scrolls, both problems existed: the fear that discoverers would indiscriminately sell
fragments of texts on the antiquities market, and that competition among multiple museums and
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challenge posed by physical dispersal of an author’s papers among
private buyers is not unlike the problems created by the distribution of
intangible authorial rights over discordant national copyright regimes. 214
In the first instance, consistent access to the papers is rendered difficult.
In the latter instance, worldwide publication and distribution are
thwarted.
In sum, the unpublished letters of James Joyce, who died more
than seventy years ago, can be published without authorization in the
United States and Canada, but not in Australia and not easily in Europe,
where they are still protected by estate-held copyrights in Spain, the
United Kingdom, and possibly Ireland, as well as by estate-held moral
rights in France; and where, unpredictably, individuals and institutions
might assert piecemeal claims based on EU post-copyright copyrights.
Moreover, the rigid policies and fearful norms of some repositories
make research-based copying and even archival access a challenge. The
Joyce letters project, a long-overdue resource for studying one of the
world’s greatest writers, is a victim of the uncoordinated global
commons. In a world of willing publishers and unlimited digital
capability, the public domain for such projects remains a checkerboard
of legal yeses and nos.
III. APPROXIMATING GLOBAL HARMONY THROUGH COMPULSORY
LICENSES
How can this tragedy be given a happy, or at least a happier,
ending? How can the pieces of this patchwork public domain be
gathered together to build a global market for researchers and users?
Essentially, governments and legislators must devote the same care to
the world’s public domains as they have lavished on the world’s
copyrights. They must work to construct a unified global public domain,
to harmonize downward, as it were, instead of always upward.215 There
are signs that this is possible. The recent attempt of the U.K.

archives would hinder scholarship. See SAX, supra note 195, at 153–64.
214 A striking example of a copyright-dispersed fictional character is Sherlock Holmes. The
Holmes stories have entered the public domains of many countries, but ten of the stories remain
protected by copyright in the United States until 2022. This uncoordinated public domain for
Sherlock Holmes has resulted in litigation. See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, The Adventure of the
Shrinking Public Domain, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 578–85 (2015).
215 See SHELDON W. HALPERN & P HILLIP JOHNSON, HARMONISING COPYRIGHT LAW AND
DEALING WITH DISSONANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CONVERGENCE OF US AND EU LAW 9 (2014)
(“[S]uch moves toward [international copyright] harmonisation as have been adopted in the past,
have, almost without exception, taken the form of treaties increasing the rights and protections of
copyright owners, with limited parallel movement in the direction of uniform exceptions and
limitations on those rights.”); see also BALDWIN, supra note 87, at 303–04 (discussing the
“skyward” direction of international IP harmonization initiatives); Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra
note 34, at 8 (arguing that “the continuous upgrading of authors’ rights [must be] balanced by an
adequately defined and viable set of exceptions and limitations to copyright”).
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government to amend the 2039 rule216 shows that there occasionally
exists political will, at least on a national level, to bring harmony to
users’ privileges. A rare multinational effort to achieve harmony for a
particular group of users is found in the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate
Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually
Impaired, or otherwise Print Disabled.217 The efforts of various nations
to enact orphan-works legislation are also hopeful signs. 218 The power
of multilateral treaties and directives should be brought to bear on the
problem of the patchwork global commons, just as it has been used to
harmonize copyright terms and other aspects of international copyright
law. To put this another way, the legislative efforts that have been made
to eliminate national IP-law variations standing in the way of singlemarket uniformity for copyright owners219 should be mirrored by efforts
to harmonize the less visible global market for the activities of publicdomain users.220
One approach would be to make creative use of compulsory
licensing to approximate a unified public domain.221 For example, if a
See supra notes 143–150 and accompanying text.
See Historic Treaty Adopted, Boosts Access to Books for Visually Impaired Persons
Worldwide, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (June 27, 2013), http://www.wipo.int/
pressroom/en/articles/2013/article_0017.html.
218 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
219 See BALDWIN, supra note 87, at 304 (characterizing harmonization efforts as seeking to create
a single, unified market for IP products in the European Union).
220 Two general types of proposals have been advanced for solving the problem of conflicting
national copyright laws, particular in the Internet context. The first calls for the adoption by
national legislatures or other bodies of a single set of copyright law standards that would govern
globally; the second argues for special conflict-of-laws rules that would require courts to select a
single national copyright law (or a small number of national copyright laws) for resolving
copyright disputes involving multiple national laws. See Trimble, supra note 29, at 349–90. For a
proposal to harmonize U.S. copyright laws with those of the European Union, see generally
HALPERN & JOHNSON, supra note 215; Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 34 (advancing a
proposal for framing an international instrument on copyright limitations and exceptions within
current treaty obligations); cf. Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (2000) (urging international adoption of an expansive fair use
doctrine to further free trade and the public interest in global markets).
221 The copyright law of India, on a national level, provides for compulsory licensing in
circumstances where copyright owners unreasonably withhold previously published or performed
works from the public, or where owners of copyrights in unpublished works cannot be located.
See Copyright Act, 1957, §§ 31, 31A (India), http://copyright.gov.in/documents/copyrightrules
1957.pdf; TAMALI SEN GUPTA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN INDIA 27 (2011). In contrast
to the broadly remedial objectives of my proposal, compulsory licenses, whether national or
international in scope, typically permit much more limited uses of copyrighted works. See, e.g.,
Berne Convention (Paris Text), art. 13(1), July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 22 (permitting Berne
members to provide for compulsory licensing for sound recordings of musical compositions, with
“equitable remuneration” to authors); see also id. art. 11bis(2) (compulsory licensing for
broadcasting and rebroadcasting of authors’ works), 17 U.S.C § 111 (2014) (secondary cable
transmissions), id. § 115 (sound recordings of nondramatic musical works), id. § 119 (2014)
(secondary satellite transmissions). For an overview of recent scholarly proposals for the use of
compulsory licenses and other liability rules to address copyright inefficiencies, mostly in the
area of digital and Internet technologies, see Thomas B. Nachbar, Rules and Standards in
Copyright, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 583, 585–88, 601–09 (2014).
216
217
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work were in the public domain in Country A, the work’s country of
origin, but still protected in Country B, an international instrument
could permit unconsented uses of the work in Country B to proceed,
subject to a compulsory license. Users could exploit the work simply by
giving notice to the rights-holder and offering to pay a reasonable use
fee. The license would be compulsory in the sense that copyright
owners would have no power to block uses.222 Here, the compulsory
license would essentially be doing the work of the rule of the shorter
term, which, for various reasons of national or international policy,
often fails to unify discrepant national copyright terms.223 However,
unlike the rule of the shorter term, which yokes discordant copyright
regimes together by a kind of legal violence, a compulsory license
would offer a more balanced compromise between the interests of users
and rights-holders and, by providing reasonable compensation for uses,
might escape such international strictures as the Berne/TRIPS three-step
test for assessing the impact of user-oriented limitations and exceptions
on the rights of copyright owners.224 Just as with revived copyrights in
the United Kingdom,225 a treaty-based multinational compulsory license
could help avert a users’ market failure for the borderless, “aterritorial”226 flow of public goods that would otherwise be subject to
the gridlock of the world’s inconsistent public domains.
In contrast to the rule of the shorter term, the compulsory-license
system would have to be designed to overrule any inconsistent

A compulsory license is an example of a liability rule that gives claimants non-injunctive,
monetary remedies only, in contrast to a property rule, which permits claimants to obtain
injunctive relief. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092, 1106–1110 (1972);
see also Salzberger, supra note 13, at 43–45 (discussing the potential “enhancement of the public
domain” through the use of liability rules to compensate owners of informational goods).
223 See supra notes 61–80 and accompanying text.
224 See Berne Convention (Paris Text), art. 9(2), July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 22 (providing that
members may permit unauthorized reproduction of an author’s work “[1] in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction [2] does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and
[3] does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”); Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 13, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (same); see also Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 34, at 7–8, 15–16 (characterizing
compulsory licenses limiting authors’ rights as “compensated limitations” that might satisfy the
three-step test).
225 See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. The U.K. compulsory license for use of
revived-copyright works requires only that the user give reasonable notice of the intended use and
offer a reasonable royalty or remuneration to the copyright owner. If a reasonable sum cannot be
agreed upon, a Copyright Tribunal determines the license terms. Once the user has given
reasonable notice, she is licensed, and the remuneration may be determined later. See Duration of
Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995, SI 1995/3297, arts. 24–25 (Eng.).
Similar rules could govern global commons-aggregating compulsory licenses, and an
international tribunal could be established to resolve disputes over remuneration of copyright
owners.
226 Salzberger, supra note 13, at 51.
222
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international principles, bilateral treaties, or national laws that would
defeat the operation of such a world-harmonizing liability rule.
Moreover, a stronger version of this proposed system might go further
than simply creating a remunerative, commons-constructing rule of the
shorter term. In the stronger version, if a work were in the public
domains of some or many countries, though not the country of the
work’s origin, the compulsory license would make the work available in
all countries without prior permission, again upon notice and the offer
of a reasonable use fee. Such a global liability rule would be especially
useful where copyrights linger on in a few outlier countries—such as
the United Kingdom, Spain, and Australia in the case of James Joyce’s
unpublished letters227—and continue to create obstacles to unauthorized
global dissemination.
In either the stronger or the weaker version of induced
harmonization, an international compulsory-license system would play
a role analogous to certain legal doctrines that preserve open access to
important public resources despite the claims of discrete private owners.
The infrastructure of the global public domain would thus benefit from
a public-access rule akin to the navigable servitudes228 and substantialnavigability doctrines229 that historically have protected waterways from
being impeded by private fisheries, and the prescriptive doctrines and
customary rules that have kept roadways from being shut down by
holdout landowners.230 Without requiring copyright owners to surrender
all the rights they enjoy in private-ownership countries, global
compulsory licensing would recognize a kind of public-spirited duty on
the part of owners to allow older materials of historical and cultural
interest to be made available to broad sectors of the public.231 Such a
system would play for the uncoordinated commons a role similar to that
of the single decision-maker who reconciles conflicting ownership
rights in an anticommons.232
This scheme would permit a global public domain to be
assembled, resource by resource and license by license, from the
uncoordinated patchwork of national laws, just as solutions to
anticommons problems take the form of aggregating fragments of
See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).
229 See R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 (Can.), https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scccsc/en/item/1376/index.do.
230 See Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723–27, 749–50 (1986); see generally Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 471 (1970) (inferring from diverse case law a public trust doctrine for addressing resource
management problems impacting the public interest).
231 Cf. SAX, supra note 195, at 65–68 (proposing a legal duty that would require private
collectors to make artworks available for limited public access).
232 See HELLER, supra note 14, at 151–52.
227
228
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exclusive ownership in valuable resources.233 Compulsory licensing
would function in a manner not unlike the eminent-domain power,
which permits a government to force the sale of real property at fair
market prices when there is an important project, such as a public
roadway, that requires the assembly of pieces of land controlled by
owners who might hold out for prohibitively high prices.234 This global
public domain, assembled gradually from many compulsorily-licensed
acts, would not be comprehensive, of course, but rather would come
into existence in incremental, piecemeal fashion, triggered by the need
of individual users to make worldwide use of particular works. Userselected unpublished works would serve as the catalyst for a growing,
limited-purpose public domain; and works that had suffered from
underuse would become the basis of a paying commons, remunerating
owners and benefiting the public.
This licensed public domain235 would be annexed to the actual
public domain, a pay-as-you-go commons236 coupled with the familiar
anything-goes commons. Owners and users would each give up certain
accustomed advantages. Owners would lose the ability to prohibit use in
copyright countries, and users would forgo the traditional freedom of
the commons and pay a reasonable fee for the privilege to exploit a

For example, the National Institutes of Health reformed its licensing guidelines to allow NIHfunded genomic research tools that are protected by exclusive patents to be licensed broadly and
nonexclusively to promote academic research, with the result that “research institutions are
creating, license by license, their own limited, royalty-free zone.” See id. at 62–63; see also
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–700 (1998) (describing the anticommons effects on
biomedical research when too many owners hold upstream patent rights).
234 See Rose, supra note 230, at 749–50.
235 Another approximation of the public domain is the voluntary culture of IP sharing promoted
by free software licenses and Creative Commons licenses, which have been likened to
conservation easements whereby landowners, while still possessing real estate, voluntarily give
up the ability to use it in ways that might harm the environment. See Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 23, 24–27 (2007); see also Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010) (discussing constructed commons for
sharing and resource-pooling arrangements, such as patent pools, open source software projects,
Wikipedia, and jamband communities).
236 One type of pay-as-you-go commons is the domaine public payant (paying public domain) in
which works whose copyrights have expired are granted further protection, either for a limited
time or perpetually, but may be exploited without authorization under a kind of compulsory
license or other levy, the revenues from which are not typically passed on to authors’ heirs but
rather are used for various social and cultural purposes, such as supporting living authors. See
WALTER & LEWINSKI, supra note 154, §§ 8.1.83–8.1.86, at 541–42; Carlos Mouchet, Problems
of the “Domaine Public Payant”, 8 COLUM. J. ART & L. 138, 152–56 (1983). Argentina and
Ghana currently employ versions of this system; other countries, such as the Czech Republic,
adopted but later abandoned it. See Ana Santos Rutschman, Steps Towards an Alignment of
Intellectual Property in South-South Exchanges: A Return to TRIPS, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 515, 549–53 nn.205–06 (2015). I am not proposing here that the entire public domain be
reconstituted as a domaine public payant.
233
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work throughout the world.237 This two-tiered or hybrid public domain
would have the signal virtue of being more navigable than the present
fragmented public domain. Moreover, as works eventually shed their
protection in copyright countries, those works would leave the pay-asyou-go commons and enter the anything-goes commons. For example,
once James Joyce’s copyrights had expired in the last copyright country,
his writings could be said to have truly entered the global public
domain.
Such a system would offer relief for much of the world’s commons
congestion, but it would not solve all problems. For example, European
moral rights, which have resisted most efforts to harmonize IP laws,238
would likely prove resistant to treaty-based compulsory licenses as well.
Furthermore, since it would be aimed primarily at easing the
transnational impact of disparate copyright durations, this scheme
would do little to harmonize subsidiary user-oriented rules, such as fair
use and fair dealing.239 However, the E.U. post-copyright copyrights
would fit comfortably within a compulsory-license system—perhaps on
the tested model of the U.K. compulsory license for revived
copyrights.240 The E.U. after-rights might even be prospectively
abolished or subjected to some other harmonization scheme that would
reduce the threat of rights-grabs by opportunists who have obtained
copies of original documents held by others, or by repositories more
interested in controlling private assets than providing public access.241
Some combination of these moderating initiatives might turn a tragedy
of the unpublished public domain into a comedy, 242 or a tragicomedy,243
Cf. Mark Davison, Database Protection: The Commodification of Information, in THE
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 167, 184
(Lucie Guibault et al. eds., 2006) (urging a “teleological” conception of the public domain that
recognizes “a right to access privately owned information in a non-exclusionary manner such as
via compulsory licenses”).
238 See WALTER & LEWINSKI, supra note 154, §§ 16.0.22–16.0.23, at 1472–74.
239 See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text. Nor would this scheme address the
disharmonized state laws governing sound recordings in the United States. See supra notes 106–
121 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 95–98, 225 and accompanying text. Another comparable compulsory license
is the one that permits a party to continue to exploit a derivative work which the party created
prior to the restoration of U.S. copyright in a foreign work. The license requires reasonable
compensation for continued exploitation and provides that disputes over compensation will be
resolved by an action in a U.S. District Court. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3) (2002).
241 See Hirtle, supra note 125, at 240 (noting that “[m]any repositories would like to maintain a
kind of quasi-copyright-like control over the further use of materials in their holdings,
comparable to the monopoly granted to the copyright owner”).
242 The phrase “comedy of the commons” is used by Carol Rose to suggest a productive blending
of commerce and open access in traditional collective activities, unconstrained by private
ownership claims. See Rose, supra note 230, at 768–71. Though Rose discusses roadways,
waterways, and other physical resources, her concept of an interactive commons may fruitfully be
applied to public goods like intellectual property. See id. at 723.
243 I use “tragicomedy” in the sense of “tragedy transcended,” a kind of plot found in certain
dramas, including Shakespeare’s, in which conflict is resolved and tragic possibilities are avoided
237
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of the global copyright commons.
CONCLUSION
The global public domain is an uncoordinated commons. To speak
of a unitary, worldwide public domain is to deal in abstraction. It would
be more accurate to say that the global market contains many
inconsistent public domains, or that the world’s cultural commons
incorporates many fragments of private ownership the size of nations.
Nations enact copyright laws that conflict with the laws of other
nations. These inconsistencies collectively generate global gridlock for
scholars, researchers, hobbyists, and others: a regulatory tragedy for
users and consumers. This gridlock results not so much from the actual
prohibitions of copyright owners as from the crazy-quilt coexistence of
commons and private ownership, spread inconsistently over multiple
countries, that deters many uses or confines them to tragically local
exercise. In this vast, unassembled jigsaw puzzle, a single unpublished
resource may be public-domain in some countries, protected by
copyright in others, subject to moral rights (despite expired copyright
protection) in still others, and, in the European Union, potentially
protected, even after copyrights have terminated, by new rights acquired
randomly by first disseminators. The Internet and other forms of
distribution continue to operate, but users are discouraged from making
works widely available. The consequence is that researchers and the
general public become victims of tragic underuse.
Attempts to impose international harmony on national copyright
laws have not harmonized the world’s public domains. Instead, such
efforts have always left a fragmented commons. One possible solution
would be to employ an international system of compulsory licenses,
based on treaties or other instruments, that would permit unconsented
use in countries where works were still protected by copyright despite
having entered the public domain of their origin country or perhaps of
other countries. Compulsory licenses would offer a middle way between
complete forfeiture of owners’ rights and continued obstruction of
users’ activities, and between actual repeal of discrepant national laws
and the perpetuation of today’s disharmonized world commons. Such an
approach would not bring about a magical transformation of the world’s
copyright laws, but rather would create a mechanism for approximating
global harmony from the particular needs of many individual users,
in the end, as in the “resolution of revenge through forgiveness.” See ERIC BENTLEY, THE LIFE
OF THE DRAMA 318–19 (Applause Theatre Books 1991) (1964). Other legal scholars have used
“tragicomedy” in a different sense to suggest a mixture of tragic and comic elements in the
commons. E.g., Brigham Daniels, The Tragicomedy of the Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1347,
1355–56 (2014); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual
Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 64 (2003).
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each user cutting a new pragmatic path through the bramble of the
conflicted commons. This would be a constructed, pay-as-you-go
commons, a bespoke public domain responsive to the demands of users,
paid for by reasonable tolls that would help the traffic along instead of
acting as dead-end property rules. Compulsory licensing, or a similar
system of enlightened compromise, could thus bring functional
coordination to the uncoordinated public domain.

